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We investigate the public private wage differentials in ten euro area countries (Austria, 
Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain). To account 
for differences in employment characteristics between the two sectors, we focus on micro data 
taken from EU SILC. The results point to a conditional pay differential in favour of the public 
sector that is generally higher for women, at the low tail of the wage distribution, in the 
Education and  the  Public  administration sectors  rather  than  in the  Health sector.  Notable 
differences emerge across countries, with Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain exhibiting 
higher public sector premia than other countries. 
 
 
JEL Classification: J310, J450, O520. 
Keywords: wage differentials, public/private sector. 
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NON TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
The relationship between public and private sector wages has attracted increasing attention over recent 
decades reflecting the increase in public sector employment in many countries, with relevant implications for 
the overall macroeconomic performance and for public finances. Furthermore, amid tight government budget 
constraints as a consequence of the financial crisis, public sector wages have become a growing concern for 
taxpayers. In this paper we investigate this issue focussing on ten euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain). 
According to national account aggregate data, the wage earned by a representative public sector employee is 
higher than the one earned by a representative private sector employee in all the countries of this study, 
except Belgium, France and Germany. In particular, in the period 1995-2009 the ratio of public to private 
compensation per employee is found to be consistently below one in the case of France, slightly below one in 
the cases of Germany and Belgium, around 1.1 for Austria, around 1.2-1.3 for Italy, Spain, Greece, Ireland 
and Slovenia, and above 1.5 for Portugal.  
However, it is well documented that public sector employees are generally older, better educated and are 
more likely to take managerial positions. In addition, wage dispersion is much higher in the private sector 
than in the public sector. Hence, controlling for individual characteristics is necessary to determine the 
existence of a true “premium” in the public sector, i.e. whether, ceteris paribus, public sector employees are 
better paid than employees in the private sector. Relatively high per-capita wages in the public sector, if not 
justified by differences in labour skills or occupational position, may produce inefficient job queues and 
“wait” unemployment, adverse effects in recruitment, retention and incentive policies, spillovers to the 
private labour market with associated competitiveness losses, as well as budgetary problems.
find a differential in favour of public sector workers, even after taking into account some observable 
individual characteristics. By using data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) - a harmonized survey at European level providing coherent measures and definitions 
- we are able to adopt a cross-national perspective.  
As in the previous studies, our results, referring to the period 2004-2007, point to a conditional pay 
differential in favour of the public sector that is generally higher for women, for workers at the bottom of the 
wage distribution, in the Education and the Public administration sectors rather than in the Health sector. We 
also find notable differences across countries, with Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain exhibiting 
higher public sector premia than other countries. The differential generally decreases when considering 
monthly wages as opposed to hourly wages and if we restrict our comparison to large private firms.  
Although our documentation of the institutional settings is far too simple to allow us to draw any conclusion 
on a possible relationship between institutions and labour market conditions in the two sectors, our results 
seem to provide little support to the idea that a systematic comparison between wage levels in the two sectors 
is actually necessary or sufficient to guarantee non divergent wage dynamics; moreover, we did not detect 
any specific correlation between the size of the public-private wage differential and either the unions’ 
bargaining power or the relative bargaining power of unions in private and public sectors.  
A large body of literature has analysed the issue using micro-data on single countries. Most of these studies 6
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1.  Introduction 
The relationship between public and private sector wages has attracted increasing attention over recent 
decades reflecting the fact that public sector labour markets have grown in size in many countries, so that 
the implications of their functioning for overall macroeconomic performance as well as for the public 
finances  has  become  increasingly  relevant.  Furthermore,  amid  current  tight  government  budget 
constraints, public sector wages have become a growing concern for taxpayers.  
Political, institutional and economic reasons can be provided to explain the determination of 
public and private sector wages. While the public sector is subject to political constraints, the private 
sector is subject to profit constraints. In most cases, the public sector wants to be a good employer and 
may be willing to pay higher wages to its employees, especially to its lower skilled workers. By contrast, 
the government might be reluctant to award higher wages to high skilled workers, as the public may not 
want  to  see  public  servants  earning  more  than  comparably  trained  and  experienced  private  sector 
counterparts (Katz and Kruger 1993; Bender and Elliott 1999; Bender 2003). 
The pursuit of these actions could have a serious impact on labour market efficiency. From an 
economic  perspective,  if  the  government  rewards  its  employees  with  high  remuneration,  candidate 
workers may decide to queue for these relatively high paying jobs. The outcome is that private sector 
employment will be ‘crowded out’ unless private sector wages increase. Furthermore such a policy could 
lead to higher budget deficits and/or higher taxes. If, instead, the public sector pays lower wages than in 
the private sector, it might become difficult to recruit and retain skilled employees. The result could then 
be public services of poor and inadequate quality, even though some other characteristics (job security, 
work contents or pension level, for example) could continue to be attractive enough.  
Differentials in earnings can have significant effects on the wage setting behaviour of the private 
sector.  In  cases  where  public  sector  wages  ‘lead’  private  sector  wages,  the  closing  of  an  earnings 
differential may negatively affect competitiveness via wage inflation.
 1 Moreover, the existence of such 
wage differentials between the two sectors of employment is important in the debates over public sector 
pay structure reform (Elliot et al. 1996). 
This paper investigates a particular aspect of the relationship between public and private sector 
wages, namely, the public private wage gap, across a selection of euro area countries.  
We analyse the public sector pay gap in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain, first by looking at its evolution over the last fifteen years using 
National Accounts data. Then, to account for the significant heterogeneity in employee characteristics (for 
example, age, gender, education and occupational level) across the public and private sectors, we estimate 
a wage equation using micro data covering the period 2004 2007. Unlike most of the existing studies that 
evaluate the differential across countries, we distinguish by gender, educational level, sub sectors and 
firm size, and check the robustness of our results using different definitions of wages (hourly versus 
monthly, gross versus net). Furthermore, we perform our analysis not only on averages but over the entire 
wage distribution. Data are taken from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions 
(EU SILC), which provides comparable cross sectional information on income, poverty, social exclusion 
and living conditions in the European Union.    
While  aggregate  data  provide  indication  about  the  existence  of  a  differential  between  the 
compensation per employee paid in the public and in the private sectors, it is necessary to control for 
individual characteristics to determine the existence of a true “premium” in the public sector, i.e. whether 
                                                       
1 A strong positive correlation between wages per employee in the public and the private sector is found for most OECD 
countries (Lamo, Pérez and Schuknecht, 2008). Moreover, causality analysis using macro data (Lamo et al, 2011, Pérez and 
Sánchez, 2011) has shown that the determination of public wages do have some impact on the determination of private sector 
wages, even though this is consistent also with effects stemming from the private sector into the public sector (bi directional 
links). More generally, empirical evidence on euro area countries and the euro area as a whole over the last 30 years shows pro 
cyclical (with one/two year lags) co movements of government wage spending, compensation per employee and employment 
(Lamo et al., 2007). This is consistent with a political economy view of the behaviour of public wages, whereby governments 
find it harder in favourable economic conditions to resist pressures to raise employment, wages and thus wage expenditure. 
Similarly, in an economic downturn, government wage expenditure appears to be one of the tools for discretionary tightening, in 
order to limit deficit increases.  7
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ceteris paribus public employees are better paid than employees in the private sector.
 In fact, it is well 
documented that public sector employees are generally older, hold higher educational degrees, are more 
likely to take managerial positions and (at least in some countries) are more likely to work full time. 
Nevertheless, the analysis with micro data confirms the existence of a pay differential in the public sector, 
after controlling for the aforementioned individual characteristics. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of the main institutional 
features of wage setting in each of the countries considered; Section 3 describes the evolution of the 
private/public wage gap in aggregate data; in Section 4 the evidence from the existing literature and the 
results from our analysis on micro data are presented; Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2.  The institutional settings 
Despite  the  substantial  institutional  changes  implemented  over  recent  decades  aimed  at  increasing 
competition and efficiency in the public sector, the set of rules that govern pay and working conditions 
still differ significantly across private and public sectors in most EU countries.  
In this Section, we briefly summarize some of the main characteristics of wage setting in the 
countries included in our study. Further details together with some information about recent reforms 
implemented in each country are reported in the Country appendix at the end of this paper.   
In all countries collective bargaining plays a major role in public wage setting, even though the 
outcome of the bargaining process may not be legally binding for the government (notably, in France and 
Portugal). One exception is Greece, where public sector pay is determined by law, according to the 
government’s  annual  income  policies;  a  law  was  passed  in  1999  recognising  the  right  to  collective 
bargaining  in  the  public  sector;  pay  issues  are  however  excluded  from  the  bargaining  procedure.  In 
addition, wages in Germany for civil servants (only) are set by law. Typically, the same unions negotiate 
for  both  the  private  and  the  public  sectors,  albeit  independently  and  at  different  points  in  time;  the 
bargaining results therefore generally differ across sectors. In Portugal, different unions represent workers 
in each sector. 
Wage determination mechanisms in the public sector that envisage a systematic comparison with 
the  levels  in  the  private  sector  –  separately  for  different  economic  sectors,  geographical  areas  and 
educational and professional qualifications – may be useful to guarantee wage dynamics in the public 
sector consistent with macroeconomic and labour market conditions.
2 Among the countries considered in 
this study, only Ireland has examined public sector pay vis à vis private sector pay; specifically in 2002 
and 2007. In all other countries such an approach is typically absent and the reference is generally given 
by the cost of living and public budget conditions (Table 1).  
With the exception of Belgium and Germany – where pay determination is decentralized by 
regions and communities and for the Länder, respectively – wages in the public sector are set uniformly at 
a country level. In several countries (namely, Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain) negotiations 
are typically conducted separately for individual sectors (administration, defence, health, etc.) and/or 
government levels, even though de facto wages tend to move together. One reason for this is that in some 
of these countries all agreements have to satisfy common guidelines set for all sub sectors coherently with 
the government programmes (e.g. the government may specify a growth rate for the average wage in the 
public sector according to the resources allocated by the budget to compensation of employees). 
 
 
                                                       
2 To this respect the institutional setting in the UK provides an interesting example. In the UK, the pay of a large proportion of 
public sector employees is determined through Pay Review Bodies (PRB). PRB make recommendations to the government on 
pay awards for the workers they represent that are based on the need to recruit, labour market conditions, the inflation target set 
by the government, the competitiveness with the private sector, and any difference in terms and conditions of employment 
between public and private sectors; they consider the broad employment package including relative job security. 
 8
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Table 1 – Some basic features of wage bargaining 
 
 
Public/private Geographical Sector/Level of
comparison area government Total Public
Austria No Yes No 38.4 68.5
Belgium No No No 55.4 n.a.
Germany No No No 27.0 56.3
Spain No Yes No 15.7 32.0
France No Yes No 8.2 15.3
Greece No Yes Yes n.a. n.a.
Ireland Yes Yes Yes 34.0 61.0
Italy No Yes No 33.7 n.a.
Portugal  No Yes Yes 36.0 45.0
Slovenia No Yes Yes n.a. n.a.
Centralized setting (1) Union density (2)
 
Notes: (1) Geographical area: yes means that wages are set uniformly all over the country, no otherwise; Sector/level of government: yes means 
that basic wage is set uniformly at all government sectors/ level of government, no otherwise. (2) Source: Visser (2006), except for Ireland and 
Portugal;  Union  density  is  defined  as  the  share  of  membership  within  the  employed  dependent  labour  force  (i.e.  excluding  retired  and 
unemployed) in total employment. Data refer to 1991 1995 for Portugal, 1997 for Germany and Spain, 1998 for Austria, 2002 for Belgium, 2003 
for France and Italy, 2009 for Ireland. Union density for the public sector in Ireland refers to NACE LMN. 
 
Available  data  on  union  membership  –  referring  to  the  period  1997 2009  depending  on  the 
country    show that union density (measured by the ratio between reported membership and employed 
dependent labour force) is typically much higher in the public than in the private sector (in the European 
countries approximately twice as much). Among the countries included in this study, union density rates 
are relatively high in Belgium (around 50%), followed by Austria, Ireland, Italy and Portugal (in the 30 
40% range) and Germany (27%); it is relatively low in France (about 8%) and Spain (16%).  
 
 
3.  The wage gap in aggregate data 
3.1 Data sources for earnings and employment 
In  order  to  determine  the  wage  gap,  it  is  first  necessary  to  compute  the  average  wage  per 
employee (i.e. the ratio between wages and employment) in the public and private sectors. The numerator 
of the wage gap, the concept of total compensation of employees (or alternatively wages and salaries) in 
the government sector is a well defined statistical concept homogeneous for all the countries considered 
in  the  study;
  3  this  is  not  the  case  for  the  denominator.  The  number  of  employees  in  the  general 
government sector has only been included as part of the ESA95 transmission programme quite recently. 
To date, coverage is limited to Germany, France, Italy, Malta, Portugal, Slovenia, Belgium and Slovakia 
and in some cases, only short and/ outdated employee series are available. 
Within the ESA95 framework, an approximation of the public sector wage bill can be estimated 
by combining NACE Rev. 1.1 categories L, M and N, namely, “Public Administration and defence”, 
“Health and social work” and “Education”, respectively. There are, however, drawbacks attached to this 
approach given that some of the employees included in NACE sectors M and N, namely, “Health and 
social work” and “Education” also relate to activities classified as market/private services (e.g. private 
hospitals and private schools); the share of such activities varies across countries. Nevertheless, in our 
study we will pay special attention to this classification, as the dataset for the part on micro data follows 
the  same  definitions.  In  addition,  an  advantage  of  this  classification  is  that  the  numerator  and  the 
denominator of the wage gap are fully homogeneous. 
Some general remarks have to be made as regards the use of compensation of public employees 
(or  wages  and  salaries)  data,  for  cross–country  comparisons.  First,  the  ratio  of  compensation  of 
                                                       
3  Greece is an exception: see, in the Country appendix on Greece, the paragraph “Data on Earnings and Employment”. 9
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government employees over GDP varies substantially across the countries subject of this study. Indeed, it 
ranged in 2009 from 7.4% of GDP in Germany to 13.3% in France. Some of these discrepancies reflect 
differences in the remuneration of public employees, in the efficiency of the government services, in the 
cost and financing arrangements of the social security systems for government employees and, clearly, in 
the  country specific  preferences  over  the  weight  of  the  government  in  the  respective  economies. 
However, it is important to note that the government wage bill in GDP is not necessarily correlated with 
government  spending,  i.e.  countries  with  lowest  wage  bills  are  not  those  with  the  lowest  primary 
expenditure ratios. This apparent paradox can be explained by resorting to the differences in the sectoral  
delimitation of the general government sector across countries.
4 Healthcare is the activity where these 
differences are most relevant. All EU governments finance a sizeable part of the healthcare costs for their 
citizens. However, the way these costs are recorded in their accounts differs from country to country. In 
countries where hospitals are owned and managed directly by the government, healthcare wage related 
costs are recorded as salaries paid in the government accounts. In countries where hospitals are private or 
in the cases in which public hospitals are managed by private firms, the costs borne by government will 
be accounted for under categories other than the wage bill, such as social payments. 
A second issue regards the definition of total compensation of employees. The national accounts 
concept includes wages and salaries and employers' social contributions. The latter is split into actual 
contributions  and  imputed  contributions.  In  the  ESA95  methodology,  imputed  social  contributions 
“represent the counterpart of unfunded social benefits paid directly by employers to their employees or 
former employees (...) without involving an insurance enterprise or autonomous pension fund (...)”. This 
means that where pensions are directly paid by the public employer, the concept “total compensation” 
includes expenditure for public sector pensioners, together with other elements, usually covered by the 
social security; in the other cases, it includes an actuarial imputation on current employees. To give a 
measure of the heterogeneity across countries, in 2009 the item “Compensation of employees” excluding 
“Wages and salaries” and “Employers actual social contributions” amounted to 0.3% of GDP in Italy and 
Slovenia, 0.9% in Spain, 1% in Germany, 1.6% in Austria, 1.9% in France, 2.3% in Belgium, 2.8% in 
Greece and 2.9% in Portugal. 
Of course, the first previous general remark also applies to the micro data that will be used in the 
main part of the study. For the sake of homogeneity across the paper, in what follows we will use the 
concept of “public sector” as defined by the NACE classification mentioned before. Nevertheless, in an 
Annex we also present stylized facts computed on the basis of the general government delimitation. 
 
3.2 Some stylized facts 
As illustrated in Table 2, both compensation per employee and wages per employee in the public 
sector grew above that of the private sector over the period 1999 2007 in Belgium, Spain, Ireland, Italy 
and Greece, taking as a measure of the public sector the LMN groups of the NACE classification. In 
Austria, Germany, Portugal, Slovenia and France, public sector wages grew in line or below private 
sector wages. This behaviour is broadly consistent with the one observed using general government data 
(see Appendix II), and it is also in line with the grouping suggested by Holm Hadulla et al. (2010) when 
analyzing euro area countries according to public wage dynamics in the post 1999 period. 
The dynamic behaviour displayed in Table 2 has a parallel in the evolution of the ratio of public 
to  private  wages  (or  compensation)  per  employee  since  1999.  In  historical  terms,  for  the  euro  area 
aggregate and the euro area countries, Holm Hadulla et al. (2010) document the fall in the public sector 
wage gap during the 1970s and 1980s, as nominal wages in the private sector consistently grew at a faster 
pace than in the public sector. Public wages per employee for the euro area aggregate were one third 
higher than private wages in 1970, but the ratio fell to just above 1.1 by 1989. Since 1989, the downward 
trend in this ratio has reversed decisively and in particular since 1999. 
In Figure 1 we take a relatively long historical perspective and plot the evolution of the ratio of 
public  to  private  compensation  per  employee  for  the  period  1995 2009.  Some  facts  are  worth 
highlighting. First, the moderate dynamics of the wage gap in the period 1995 1998 reflected the fiscal 
                                                       
4 For a broad discussion on this issue, see WGPF (2002), “Differences in government accounts across EU countries: the public 
wage bill”, mimeo. 10
ECB




consolidation efforts undertaken by many countries to access the EMU. Second, since the inception of 
EMU,  the  gap  increased  steadily  for  Italy,  Spain,  Ireland  and  Portugal  (until  2005);  in  the  case  of 
Slovenia it decreased until 2007 and increased thereafter. Third, as regards the level of the aggregate gap, 
it was consistently below 1 in the case of France, slightly below 1 in the case of Germany and Belgium, 
around 1.1 in Austria, around 1.2 1.3 for Italy, Spain, Greece, Ireland and Slovenia, and above 1.5 in 
Portugal. The picture that emerges using alternative data sources and wages instead of compensation is 
broadly similar (see Appendix II and Holm Hadulla et al., 2010).
5 
 
Table 2 – Compensation per employee and wages and salaries per employee in the public and the 
private sectors. Cumulative percent growth in nominal terms over 1999-2007 
Public sector Private Sector Total Economy Public sector Private Sector Total Economy
NACE LMN proxy sector NACE LMN proxy sector
AT 16.9 18.8 18.2 17.9 20.5 19.8
BE 24.3 23.6 23.7 24.9 23.6 23.9
DE 6.8 9.5 9.0 7.1 10.1 9.6
ES 34.8 21.1 23.9 39.2 19.7 23.8
FR 25.8 25.7 25.8 24.7 28.5 27.6
GR 50.2 46.5 48.0 48.4 46.5 47.4
IE 64.0 56.2 59.2 59.4 55.5 57.6
IT 34.0 19.0 22.2 36.1 20.2 23.6
PT 30.2 32.2 32.0 20.9 31.4 28.5
SI 72.9 87.7 84.7 68.1 85.9 82.1
Compensation per employee Wages and salaries
 
Notes: “Public sector” data for Austria refer to LMNO sectors; for Germany refer to LN sectors. The data for Greece refer to time period 2000 
2007, for Ireland 1998 2008, for Portugal 1995 2007 and for France 1999 2008. Source: Eurostat. 
 
Figure 1 – Ratio  of public to private compensation per employee. Public sector proxied by the 











1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
IT ES IE GR SI PT  BE AT DE FR
Notes: “Public sector” data for Austria refer to LMNO sectors; for Germany refer to LN sectors. Source: Eurostat. 
While from a macroeconomic perspective certain analyses that take an aggregate perspective on 
public private wage interactions, like public/private sector wage leadership or the cyclical properties of 
                                                       
5 As regards the period 2010 and beyond, Appendix III provides some details on public wage policies since the start up of the 
crisis. 11
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public wages (see Holm Hadulla et al., 2010, and the reference quoted therein), can be appropriate and 
informative for policy makers and academics alike, and can be rationalized within macro models,
6 the 
analysis of the size and determination of the wage gap deserves an additional step forward. In order to 
assess whether a true premium on public wages actually exist, a microeconomic analysis is needed, given 
that individual characteristics are key to understanding the determinants of the observed wage differential. 
 
 
4.  The wage gap in micro data 
4.1 A review of the literature  
Early research comparing the earnings of public and private sector employees has been performed 
by Smith (1976, 1977) using data on the United States. She found that rates of pay were higher for public 
sector than private sector employees, and that the wage premium was larger for female than for male 
public sector employees. Several studies have documented the fact that workers employed in the federal 
government earned 10% to 15% more than equally productive workers in the private sector during the 
1970s (Smith 1976; Moore and Raisin 1991; Katz and Krueger 1991). However, this wage gap was 
eventually reduced during the 1980s. By employing quantile regression analysis, Poterba and Rueben 
(1994)  documented  a  changing  pattern  of  wage  differentials  between  state  and  local  government 
employees and their private sector counterparts for the period from 1979 to 1992 in the United States. 
They  showed  that  the  wage  distribution  was  wider  in  the  private  sector  and  that  state  and  local 
government workers enjoyed a wage premium at the lower tail of the distribution, but a wage penalty at 
the upper tail. They showed that the size of the public sector wage premium was sensitive to whether 
controls for workers’ occupational classification were included in the wage regressions. Mueller (1998) 
used quantile regressions to estimate the size of the public sector wage premium for Canada. He found 
that public sector pay differentials tend to be highest for federal government employees, females and 
individuals at the lower tail of the wage distribution. Similar results were reported by Cai and Liw (2008) 
for  Australia.  Utilizing  quantile  regression  analysis,  they  show  that  the  public  sector  pay  premium 
declines at the higher spectrum of the wage distribution and becomes negative for male workers at the top 
half of the conditional wage distribution. 
Studies investigating the existence of a public private wage differential in Europe have provided 
interesting  findings.  Ehrenberg  and  Schwarz  (1986)  and  Gregory  and  Borland  (1999)  provide  a 
comprehensive review of international empirical studies of the public private wage differential. The result 
for the United Kingdom is that civil servants earn more than comparable workers in the private sector 
(Rees and Shah 1995; Elliot, Murphy and Blackaby 1996; Bender and Elliott 1999; Bender 2003). Rees 
and Shah (1995) find that the average wage differential ranges from 9.8% to 11.4% for males and from 
22.3% to 26.3% for females from 1983 to 1987. Elliot, Murphy and Blackaby (1996) using sample 
selection techniques for the UK find that the wage premium for men is caused by differences in public 
and private characteristics. Bender and Elliott (1999) show that the differential increased from 23.2% to 
29.45%  for  all  public  sector  employees  using  data  for  1991  and  1994.  Bender  (2003)  applying 
decomposition analysis find that differences in wage structures of the public and private sector employees 
and unobservable factors that determine wages have important effects in different parts of the wage 
distributions of male and female workers. Chatterji et. al. (2010) report a raw public private earnings gap 
for  full time  employees  in  the  United  Kingdom,  on  average,  around  14  per cent. The  gap  for  male 
employees is less than half that for females. Their results show that whilst much of the public private 
earnings gap for males can be explained by individual characteristics, occupation and workplace features, 
a substantial proportion of the gap for women remains unexplained. 
Among the papers reporting evidence for Germany, Dustman and Van Soest (1997) use micro 
data for the years 1984 93 to analise developments and differences in public and private sector wage 
distributions for both men and women. They show that   conditional on education, marital status and age   
wages are higher in the private sector for men and higher in the public sector for women. Melly (2005) 
reports similar results to Dustman and Van Soest (1997). He measures and decomposes the differences in 
earnings distributions between public and private sector employees in Germany for the years 1984 2001. 
                                                       
6 See for example Fernández de Córdoba et al. (2011). 12
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Results suggest that conditional wages are higher in the public sector for women but lower for men; the 
“premium” is highest at the lower end of the distribution and then monotonically decreases by moving up 
the wage distribution. His findings are stable over the ’80s and the ’90s. Similarly to Melly, Jürges (2002) 
found a pay penalty for male public sector employees and a premium for female. 
Hartog and Oosterbeek (1993) analise the wage structures in both public and private sectors in the 
Netherlands, using an endogenous switching regression model. They find that the earnings prospects of 
public sector workers are better in the public sector than in the private sector, whereas for private sector 
workers they are better in the private sector. They conclude that workers have efficiently selected to work 
in the sectors in which they are employed. 
Bargain and Melly (2008) estimate the public wage gap in France for the period 1990 2002 at the 
mean  and  at  different  quantiles  of  the  wage  distribution  for  both  sexes.  Controlling  for  unobserved 
heterogeneity by using fixed effects estimation on panel data they report that public sector premia or 
penalties are indeed much lower than commonly found. In particular, public wage premia for women and 
penalties for men are the result of the selection of the employees. Finally, only small pay differences 
between sectors remain over time, reflecting fluctuations due to specific public policies and the pro 
cyclical movement of private sector wages. A study by Beffy (2010) based on the waves 1994 to 2001 of 
the French European Household Survey analyses the public private gaps. It shows that the measure of 
public – private gap is very sensitive to control variables. More precisely, it varies when self selection 
into the public sector is or is not taken into account. The authors introduce unobserved heterogeneity in 
the  propensity  to  be  employed  in  either  job  sector,  and  in  the  sector specific  productivity  and  find 
evidence of a large public private wage premium for low public wages. This conclusion also holds for 
women but may be explained by a weaker discrimination in the public sector. Unlike women, most male 
civil servants would earn more in the private sector.  
Lucifora and Meurs (2006) examine the public private pay determination for three European 
countries, France, Great Britain and Italy in 1998 and show that the low skilled public sector workers are 
paid on average higher wages with respect to their private sector counterparts, whilst the reverse is true 
for high skilled workers. They also find that the premium is greater for female public sector employees 
than for males. Brunello and Dustmann (1997) compare public private wage differentials in Italy and in 
Germany. They find a positive wage gap in both countries, higher in Italy than in Germany (21 and 7 per 
cent, respectively). Moreover, by decomposing the gap into two factors, one due to observable and the 
other  to  unobservable  characteristics  (i.e.,  the  premium),  they  conclude  that,  for  given  individual 
characteristics, working in the public sector is penalizing in Germany and rewarding in Italy.  
Empirical research, employing microdata for Italy, has documented the existence of a positive 
public sector wage premium depending on the period and the specification considered. Bardasi (1996), 
using data from the Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), which contains 
information about personal and occupational characteristics, wages (net of income and payroll taxes) and 
type of economic activity, looks at 1991 incomes and employs a two stage econometric model to take into 
account the possibility that the distribution of people between sectors may not be casual, but rather result 
from self selection. She finds a public private wage differential of 9 and 35 per cent for men and women, 
respectively. If workers were distributed randomly across sectors, the average wage in the public sector 
would be 25 and 17 per cent higher for men and women, respectively. Comi et al. (2002), also using data 
from SHIW, analise the gap over the period 1977 1998. They find a positive wage premium for the public 
sector that is higher for women and for low income workers. They observe that such premium, after 
having reached a peak in 1995 (20 per cent for women, after controlling for individual characteristics), 
started decreasing in 1998. They explain the wage moderation in the public sector observed in the last 
part  of  their  sample  period  also  by  mentioning  the 1993  reform.  An  analysis  of  pay  differentials at 
regional level is provided by Dell'Aringa et al. (2007) that shows a higher premium in the South and in 
the Islands than in Centre or Northern Italy.  
Finally, Depalo and Giordano (2011) investigate the public private sector pay gap using Italian 
data for the period 1998 2008. Without controlling for possible endogeneity of the public sector choice, 
they report a public sector premium averaging at about 14 per cent for women and 4 per cent for men; the 
premium is much higher when possible sorting is considered. Their findings are in line with the results 
obtained by Giordano (2010), which also reveal the existence of a positive wage differential for public 13
ECB




sector workers, even after controlling for observable characteristics, over all in the southern regions, for 
women and for low skill workers.  
There is a limited number of studies trying to measure the wage differential between the public 
and the private sectors in Greece. Kioulafas, Donatos, and Michailidis (1991) estimated the differences 
between the earnings of public and private sector employees for the years 1975, 1981, 1982, and 1985 
and found that the earnings of the former exceed those of the latter by 20 to 25%. Kanellopoulos (1997) 
using data for 1997 for Greece shows that public sector employees receive higher earnings than private 
sector employees. Papapetrou (2003, 2006) using microdata from the European Community Household 
Panel Survey (ECHP) for Greece reports that average earnings are higher in the public sector than in the 
private sector and employees in the public sector at the lower end of the wage distribution earn a higher 
wage  gap  compared  with  their  counterparts  in  the  private  sector,  but  this  gap  decreases  at  higher 
quantiles. Furthermore, quantile regression estimation reveals that earnings differentials at the lower end 
of the wage distribution cannot be attributed to individual characteristics whereas at the highest quantiles 
pay differentials reflect differences in the employee’s endowment.  
A number of studies have examined the public private sector wage gap in Ireland. Boyle at. al. 
(2004) report wage premia for public sector workers, greater for low paid workers and smaller for public 
sector workers at the top of the earnings distribution using microdata from the European Community 
Household Panel Survey. Another study by Foley and O’Callaghan (2009), using micro data from the 
2007 National Employment Survey, also find a sizable public sector wage premium, highest at the lower 
ends of the earnings distribution. The authors use a variety of estimation techniques and control for work 
place and employee characteristics such as age, education, gender, occupation, etc. However, the authors 
urge caution in reaching a definitive conclusions on the average public sector premium. More recently, 
Kelly et. al. (2009), using data from the 2003 and 2006 National Employment Surveys, analise the public 
private sector wage gap in Ireland. Their results indicate that the public sector pay premium increased 
considerably from 14 to 26 per cent between 2003 and 2006. Moreover, they also reported that there was 
significant variation across public service sub sectors.  
The empirical evidence on wage differentials between public and private sectors utilizing micro 
data  is  limited  for  Spain.  García Pérez  and  Jimeno  (2005)  use  data  from  the  European  Community 
Household Panel and show a very high dispersion of public/private wage gaps across regions. According 
to this study, public sector wage differences across Spanish regions are mostly due to differences in 
returns, not to differences in characteristics or to selection effects, and are not constant across gender, 
educational levels or occupations. Furthermore, in regions with higher weight of public employment over 
total employment, public wage gaps are higher and public employers earn higher returns. 
Campos and Pereira (2009) for Portugal show that public sector employees earn higher wages 
than their private sector counterparts and this premium has risen over the 1996 2005 period from almost 
10% in 1996 to around 15 per cent in 2005. The premium is higher for female workers compared to male 
workers and decreases as one moves from the lower to the upper quantiles of the earnings distribution. 
International comparisons such as those provided by Strauss and Maisonneuve (2007) conclude that the 
Portuguese figure for this indicator is one of the highest in the euro area. By categories of employees, the 
premium is particularly high for women and workers in poorer regions. The same holds for employees at 
the bottom quantiles of the distribution; as one climbs up the wage distribution, the public private wage 
premium decreases and there is evidence of a penalty at the top.  
The various studies explaining labour market in Slovenia usually do not examine the public 
private sector wage gap in depth. However, Vodopivec (2004) using a wage equation shows that workers 
in private companies are paid more than those in state owned companies. Using micro data, he finds out 
that in the period 1993 2001 wages did not differ significantly across firms of different ownership types. 
Kajzer et. al. (2006), employing aggregate data, show that wages in public and private sectors differ in 
favour of the public sector, reflecting the higher educational level of employees in the public sector.  
However, if public sector wages are compared to private sector wages in activities which have similar 
education structure as the public sector, then at higher educational level the wage premium declines.   
There are a limited number of studies that analise the gap between private and public wages in 
Austria. International studies based on micro data looking at EU 15 countries tend to find that the wage 
premium of Austrian public workers is lower than that of their counterparts in other countries.  Ponthieux 14
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and  Meurs  (2005)  analise  gender  wage  gaps  for  ten  EU 15  countries  and  report  for  Austria  an 
insignificant  gap  between  public  and  private  sector  employees  and  for  male  and  female  employees. 
However, for most of the ten EU countries examined they report positive wage differentials for public 
sector employees. An analysis of Portugal and Centeno (2001) shows a negative premium for males in the 
Austrian public sector and a positive one (but below EU 15 average) for females. 
There is also no recent study using either macro or micro data that analyses the gap between 
private  and  public  wages  in  Belgium.  Among  international  studies  including  Belgium,  Portugal  and 
Centeno (2001) show a positive premium for both males and females in the Belgian public sector, but 
rather limited compared to the same premium in other countries considered. Strauss and Maisonneuve 
(2007), based on data for 2001, find a negative although not significant premium for working in the 
public sector. 
 
4.2. Evidence from EU-SILC 
4.2.1. The data 
In this work we use data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU 
SILC), which aims at collecting timely and comparable cross sectional and longitudinal multidimensional 
microdata on income, poverty, social exclusion and living conditions. For both the cross sectional and the 
longitudinal  components,  the  data  are  based  on  nationally  representative  probability  samples  of  the 
population residing in private households aged 16 and over, irrespective of language, nationality or legal 
residence status. In each year considered in this study (2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007) our overall sample 
consists of approximately 220,000 individuals, of which 28% live in Germany, about 20% live in France, 
another 20% in Italy, 15% in Spain and less than 5% in the other six countries. About 60% of these 
individuals are at work, with 85% of them being employees and the remaining 15% self employed. 
In this survey the public sector can be defined according to the NACE (REV 1.1) classification. 
In particular, we consider a public sector worker if he/she is employed in one of the following sectors: 
“Public  administration  and  defence,  compulsory  social  security”,  “Education”  or  “Health  and  social 
work”. Germany, for which health sector workers are excluded from the definition, is an exception.  Even 
though this entails an approximation that in many cases overestimates the share of public sector workers 
in total employees, from Section 4.2.2 our sample appears to be close to the population and thus we 
conclude that the selection made is a fair compromise. 
 
4.2.2. Some descriptive statistics 
In our sample, obtained by pooling the observations for the years 2004 07, the share of public sector 
workers in overall employment varies significantly across the observed countries: it ranges from 19% in 
Germany and 21% in Austria to 38% in Belgium (see Table 3a).
7 
In terms of demographic and educational backgrounds of public workers, there are substantial 
similarities  (table  3a).  In  all  countries  public  sector  workers  are  significantly  older  on  average;  the 
difference with respect to private sector workers ranges from about 1 year in Slovenia to about 7 years in 
Ireland. Public sector workers are more likely to be married in all countries. Furthermore, the share of 
females is substantially higher in the public sector; it is more than 10 percentage points higher than in the 
private  sector  in  all  countries  except  Germany.  The  share  of  workers  with  tertiary  education  is 
considerably  higher  in  the  public  sector,  with  the  difference  to  the  private  sector  being  above  15 
percentage points in all countries. 
 
                                                       
7 Notice that the descriptive statistics commented in this section refer to the public sector definition used in the regressions. It is 
the sum of Public administration, Education and Health sectors for all countries except Germany, where the Health sector is 
excluded. 15
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When comparing the terms of employment in the respective private and public sectors, one can 
detect the following patterns. The differences in the shares of permanent contracts tend to be higher 
between countries than within countries. Only in Greece and Spain the difference between the two sectors 
is larger than 4 percentage points (with the share of permanent contracts in the public sector being higher 
by 9 and 6 percentage points, respectively), while in a few countries the difference is even negative 
(meaning more permanent contracts in the private sector). Furthermore, public sector workers are more 
likely to be in a managerial position in all countries except Belgium and Slovenia. Private sector workers 
have longer working hours on average (except in Germany) and are more likely to work full time (except 





                                                       
8 It has to be noted, however, that the data on part time work and working hours has to be treated with some caution in several 
countries. For example, the share of part time workers in the private sector of Austria in this data set is lower than according 
to alternative data sources. Furthermore, it cannot be excluded that there is a downward measurement bias in working hours 
of employees of the education sector in several countries (see the analysis of subsectoral wage gaps in section 4.2.3). 
Table 3a: Descriptive statistics on characteristics of employees and terms of the labour contract
Pr.  Pu.  Diff Pr.  Pu. Diff Pr.  Pu. Diff  Pr.  Pu.  Diff  Pr.  Pu.  Diff Pr. Pu. Diff
AT  21 15  41 27 60 38  -22 15 24 9  28 36 8  37 41  4  38 36  -2 
BE  38 35  58 23 65 37  -28 13 26 12  30 24 -5 39 41  2  38 34  -4 
DE  19 24  49 25 55 48  -7  26 25 -1  23 26 3  40 43  3  35 36  1 
ES  23 28  61 34 64 42  -22 10 11 1  23 23 0  37 41  4  40 36  -4 
FR 31 23  41 18 60 34  -26 12 19 7  29 34 6  38 41  2  37 35  -2 
GR  29 19  56 36 63 48  -15 7  23 16  14 18 4  37 41  4  41 35  -5 
IE  29 28  51 23 59 34  -25 23 35 12  27 33 7  36 43  7  36 32  -4 
IT  27 9  33 24 63 43  -21 12 23 11  22 26 4  38 44  6  39 34  -5 
PT  25 9  39 30 59 34  -25 5  4  -1  18 21 4  37 41  4  41 37  -4 
SI  23 13  43 30 60 30  -30 2  3  1  29 26 -3 39 40  1  41 40  -1 
Average across employees 
(15-64) 






Male  Age Working hours Part-time work 
Pr. = private sector, Pu. = public sector, Diff = Pu. - Pr. 
Rounding may cause discrepancies in differences. 
Table 3b: Wage gaps based on descriptive statistics 
Pr. Pu. Diff  Pr.  Pu.  Diff Pr.  Pu.  Diff Pr.  Pu. Diff 
AT  12  15 24%  10 12 21%  1.9 2.1  12%  18  20 12% 
BE  15  17 12%  11 12 8%  2.3 2.3  -1% 20  19 -5%
DE  14  17 19%  11 13 21%  2.1 2.5  16%  19  23 18% 
ES  9  13 44%  7  10 42%  1.4 1.8  28%  14  17 26% 
FR 13  15 15%  10 12 22%  1.9 1.9  -1% 18  19 5% 
GR  7  11 49%  6  10 55%  1.1 1.4  24%  12  15 27% 
IE  17  24 42%  13 18 33%  2.4 3.0  25%  22  26 17% 
IT  11  15 38%  9  12 42%  1.6 1.9  17%  16  19 22% 
PT  5  9  77%  5  8 69%  0.8 1.2  47%  9 13 46% 
SI  7  9  28%  5  6 24%  1.2 1.4  26%  9 12 24% 
Pr. = private sector, Pu. = public sector, Diff = Pu. / Pr. – 1 
Rounding may cause discrepancies in differences. 
(EUR)  (EUR) 
Yearly wage Monthly wage  Hourly wage
net gross gross net
(1000 EUR)  (1000 EUR) 16
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Most importantly in the context of this paper, average wages are much higher in the public sector 
(table 3b). However, the size of the wage gap varies considerably across countries and with the selected  
measure for the wage gap. As private workers tend to work longer hours, it is not very surprising that the 
gaps in hourly wages are substantially higher than in yearly and/or monthly wages in all countries except 
Germany and Slovenia (the two countries, where the gap in working hours is smallest). Overall, wage 
gaps are smallest in Belgium and tend to be especially high in Ireland and in Southern countries, with 
Portugal having the largest gap according to all four measures.  
 
4.2.3. Regression results 
We estimate the public private sector wage premium using OLS techniques, by pooling the data for both 
sectors and introducing a dummy variable for the public sector. In particular in this regression analysis we 
estimate the difference in the hourly wage rate (y) between private and public sector (pub) workers that 
persists  after  considering  other  relevant  determinants  of  the  earning  process  (X),  using  a  Mincerian 
(Mincer, 1974) semi logarithmic wage equation: 
u pub X a y + + ¢ + = g b , 
where  α  is  the  intercept  term,  X  is  a  vector  of  regressors  measuring  a  range  of  individual  and  job 
characteristics, u is the residual term and pub is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
employee  works  in  the  public  sector  and  zero otherwise. The complete  set  of  independent  variables 
includes indicators for: marital status (non married is the reference), low and high education (medium 
education is the reference),
9 gender, labour market experience, a second degree polynomial in labour 
market experience,
10 supervising other colleagues (a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
employee has a managerial position and zero otherwise), type of work (a dummy variable that takes the 
value of one if employee is employed part time and zero otherwise). When labour market experience is 
not available for a country, we use a polynomial of second degree in age instead. 
11  
For each country, a set of dummies control for the geographical areas (NUTS2). Since we pool 
the observations for all the years, a set of dummies controls for a possible time trend. Furthermore, we use 
sample weights provided by EU SILC to make the sample comparable to the population; all the standard 
errors are robust to heteroskedasticity arising from the sample design.  
To avoid undue noises in the comparison between private and public sector workers we use only 
the sub sample of employees while self employed are excluded.  
The  variable  hourly  wage  is  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  average  hourly  earnings  of  each 
employee. It is worth emphasizing that the ideal definition of wage is the “gross monthly earnings for 
employees”, which refers to the monthly amount of money received in the main job. We have also 
checked our results using the “employee cash or near cash income” variable; in this case, as the variable 
is the sum of earnings from all the jobs done in the reference period, we consider only individuals who 
have only one job, in an attempt to avoid spurious relations. The hourly wage is calculated by dividing the 
employees’ gross monthly earnings by the hours they usually work each week (multiplied by 4). The 
hourly  wage  for  “employee  cash  or  near  cash  income”  is  calculated  accordingly.  We  report  results 
following the former definition, the hourly wage using the gross monthly earnings for employees.
12 The 
results following the hourly wage using the employee cash or near income definition are available from 
the authors upon request.  
For an easier interpretation of the coefficients, we have normalized the intercept (α). In all the 
models it refers to a man, 47 years old with 29 years of labour market experience (or, equivalently, who 
                                                       
9 Low education is defined as not having completed secondary education, medium education as having completed secondary 
education, and high education as having completed at least the first stage of tertiary education. 
10 Experience is defined as the difference between the current age and the age at first job. 
11 For Germany, Greece and Ireland experience is not available and we use age instead. 
12 As “gross monthly earnings for employees” is not available for France and Germany, for these countries we report the results 
obtained using “gross   employee cash or near cash income”. 17
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has started working when 18 years old), with intermediate education and not supervising any other of his 
colleagues. He works full time in the private sector.  
Finally, we run the same regression on several sub groups, and test a variety of null hypotheses to 
examine whether the wage premia differ across the selected sub groups. The sub groups analysed are 
male  and  female  workers;  employees  in  education,  health  services  and  public  administration;  low, 
medium and high education level employees; and various quantiles of the wage distribution. 
 
Table 4: Results from OLS regression: coefficient of the dummy variable for public sector  
Hourly gross earning for employees 
  AT BE DE ES FR GR IE IT PT SI
TOTAL
Public 0.096 *** 0.050 *** 0.109 *** 0.250 *** 0.054 *** 0.214 *** 0.187 *** 0.190 *** 0.208 *** 0.114 ***
Obs. 20187 7567 29743 41262 33477 14487 16750 63189 15259 10160
R2 0.368 0.338 0.36 0.416 0.204 0.455 0.387 0.368 0.517 0.257
F 576.2 278.8 549.5 648.0 174.4 675.2 507.3 1035.6 924.8 219.5
MEN
Public 0.039 *** 0.029 ** 0.027 ** 0.232 *** 0.039 *** 0.166 *** 0.162 *** 0.160 *** 0.190 *** 0.082 ***
Obs. 11132 4086 15028 23789 17309 8421 8379 35645 7985 5094
R2 0.373 0.353 0.431 0.4 0.221 0.439 0.38 0.373 0.459 0.262
F 308.7 166.9 363.7 356.6 92.5 409.5 344.0 626.4 422.0 119.0
WOMEN
Public 0.136 *** 0.067 *** 0.194 *** 0.262 *** 0.065 *** 0.259 *** 0.202 *** 0.221 *** 0.221 *** 0.121 ***
Obs. 9055 3481 14715 17473 16168 6066 8371 27544 7274 5066
R2 0.322 0.317 0.251 0.423 0.177 0.477 0.395 0.362 0.567 0.267
F 235.1 143.6 170.7 312.0 87.2 337.8 244.1 508.1 616.6 150.0  
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%; ** denotes significance at 5%; * denotes significance at 10%. 
 
In Table 4 we report the coefficients for the public sector indicator by gender and country. 
13  In 
all cases, the joint significance of the independent variables is high (as suggested by the F test); the R
2 is 
greater than or equal to 30% (with the exception of the cases of France and Slovenia, for which it is 
lower). 
When we pool all the countries (the coefficients, not reported in Table 4, are close to the averages 
across countries), the wage premium is on average 11.2 percentage points, larger for women (14.8 points) 
than for men (8.0 points).
14 Taking such averages as benchmarks, we identify three different groups of 
countries,  depending  on  whether  the  estimated  premium  is  smaller  than,  close  to  or  larger  than  the 
benchmark.  In  general,  in  Austria,  Belgium  and  France  the  conditional  pay  gap  is  smaller  than  the 
average, in Germany and Slovenia it is close to the average and in Spain, Greece, Ireland, Italy and 
Portugal it is higher than the average.
15,16  
The conditional pay gap also differs by gender. In most countries it is higher for women than for 
men by 5 percentage points or less; in Austria, Greece, Italy and Germany it is much higher. 
Besides single estimation analysis  a model in which each coefficient is allowed to vary across the 
public and the private sectors, so that the return on each characteristic affecting the earning process can 
differ between private and public sectors, has also been estimated. Although point estimates in some cases 
change across specifications, the main qualitative conclusions are confirmed.
17  
                                                       
13 The complete set of results is available upon request. 
14 The discrepancy between the two definitions is noticeable for Greece, Ireland and Italy. 
15 The relative position of the countries may slightly differ when the hourly net wage specification is estimated. The results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
16 As already mentioned, in these benchmark estimations the Health sector is included in the public sector in Belgium and 
excluded in Germany. As for these two countries the definition of the public sector is not clear cut, we also estimated the 
public  sector  premium  by  considering  the  health  sector  in  the  private  sector  for  Belgium  and  in  the  public  sector  for 
Germany. The results, not reported in the Table and referring to the ‘cash or near cash income’ definition of earnings, point to 
a higher premium in Belgium (3.5% in the overall sample, 1.1% for men and 5.2% for women) and a lower premium in 
Germany (5.3% in the overall sample, negative but not significant for men and 12.0% for women). This is coherent with the 
results obtained by sub sectors that suggest lower conditional wage differentials in the health sector.  
17 The empirical results are available from the authors upon request. 18
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Although relevant for many purposes, averages might conceal a number of key aspects that can 
emerge by looking at the entire conditional wage distribution. Hence, we analise whether the public 
private wage differential remains the same or varies across various quantiles of income. Table 5 presents 
estimates of  the public private sector wage differential at the 10th, 25th, 50th ,75th and 90th percentiles 
of the wage distributions by gender and country. For most countries (with the exception of Spain, Ireland 
and  Portugal)  the  public  sector  gap  is  higher  at  the  lower  quantiles  and  declines  along  the  wage 
distribution. This is further evidence that the dispersion of the wages in the public sector is much smaller 
than in the private sector. In this context, public sector employees with low wages earn a higher wage 
premium relative to higher income employees. The interquartile differences remain contained at around 5 
percentage points in Belgium, France, Italy and Austria, and the differences are marked in Slovenia, 
Greece and Germany.  In the case of Germany, Belgium, France and Slovenia the differential at the 
highest quantile becomes negative, suggesting that high income public sector employees have a wage 
disadvantage compared to their private sectors counterparts. Finally, the empirical evidence suggests the 
existence of a different premium across genders across the wage distribution and it is higher for female 
workers compared to their male counterparts. Moreover, whilst the wage gap for women is flatter than 
that of men along the wage distribution, in the countries with more pronounced wage compression, the 
premium across quantiles for women is flatter than in the other group of countries. 
 
Table 5: Results from OLS regression by income level: coefficient of the dummy variable for public 
sector  
Hourly gross earning for employees 
AT BE DE ES FR GR IE IT PT SI
TOTAL
10 0.115 *** 0.078 *** 0.299 *** 0.233 *** 0.132 *** 0.249 *** 0.161 *** 0.212 *** 0.174 *** 0.204 ***
25 0.109 *** 0.062 *** 0.177 *** 0.250 *** 0.058 *** 0.272 *** 0.198 *** 0.201 *** 0.207 *** 0.176 ***
50 0.098 *** 0.050 *** 0.079 *** 0.276 *** 0.034 *** 0.235 *** 0.211 *** 0.186 *** 0.213 *** 0.135 ***
75 0.078 *** 0.013     -0.029 *** 0.254 *** 0.007     0.175 *** 0.186 *** 0.162 *** 0.195 *** 0.069 ***
90 0.034 *** -0.027 **  -0.116 *** 0.209 *** -0.036 *** 0.091 *** 0.119 *** 0.128 *** 0.162 *** -0.026
Obs.         20187     7567     29743     41262     33477     14487     16750     63189     15259     10160
MEN
10 0.054 *** 0.069 *** 0.217 *** 0.233 *** 0.103 *** 0.286 *** 0.218 *** 0.188 *** 0.227 *** 0.184 ***
25 0.055 *** 0.040 *** 0.096 *** 0.259 *** 0.037 *** 0.267 *** 0.198 *** 0.181 *** 0.206 *** 0.126 ***
50 0.056 *** 0.022 *   -0.001     0.263 *** -0.003     0.176 *** 0.159 *** 0.158 *** 0.196 *** 0.109 ***
75 0.025 *   0.004     -0.115 *** 0.231 *** -0.023 **  0.121 *** 0.131 *** 0.135 *** 0.171 *** 0.048 ** 
90 -0.041 **  -0.018     -0.191 *** 0.177 *** -0.065 *** 0.031 *   0.063 *** 0.115 *** 0.170 *** -0.035
Obs.         11132     4086     15028     23789     17309     8421     8379     35645     7985     5094
WOMEN
10 0.170 *** 0.093 *** 0.447 *** 0.238 *** 0.152 *** 0.229 *** 0.140 *** 0.230 *** 0.147 *** 0.195 ***
25 0.156 *** 0.096 *** 0.322 *** 0.238 *** 0.079 *** 0.278 *** 0.192 *** 0.222 *** 0.214 *** 0.187 ***
50 0.126 *** 0.075 *** 0.163 *** 0.286 *** 0.064 *** 0.289 *** 0.253 *** 0.217 *** 0.241 *** 0.146 ***
75 0.111 *** 0.023 *   0.038 *** 0.274 *** 0.035 *** 0.252 *** 0.216 *** 0.185 *** 0.206 *** 0.065 ***
90 0.077 *** -0.014     -0.045 *** 0.218 *** -0.007     0.187 *** 0.153 *** 0.131 *** 0.172 *** -0.024
Obs.         9055     3481     14715     17473     16168     6066     8371     27544     7274     5066  
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%; ** denotes significance at 5%; * denotes significance at 10%. 
 
In an attempt to better understand the public sector wage premium, we also investigate other 
dimensions of the differential. 
As  a  next  step  we  split  the  public sector into  sub sectors (Table  6).  On  average  workers  in 
“Education” earn much higher wages with respect to workers with similar characteristics in the private 
sector  relative  to  workers  in  the  other  sub sectors,  while  workers  in  the  “Health”  sector  are  less  at 
advantage,  and  as  in  the  case  of  Germany  even  at  disadvantage  with  respect  to  their  private  sector 
counterparts. This finding is confirmed on the basis of a formal statistical test that strongly rejects the null 
hypothesis of equality of coefficients across sub sectors. In contrast, a closer inspection of the estimates 
reveals that the coefficients obtained for “Health” and “Public Administration, PA” are quite close in 
some countries: this is the case for Austria, Spain and Portugal in the sample of men and Greece and 
Slovenia in the sample of women (a statistical test would not reject the null hypothesis of the coefficient 
being not different at 5% confidence level). One likely reason for the larger differential in favour of 19
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workers in the educational sector in some countries is that teachers are possibly reporting the actual time 
they spend in teaching, which is less than their full workload (which may be similar to that for the other 
public employees).  Indeed, a tabulation of hours worked per week across sub sectors reveals that workers 
in the education sector report 2.5 working hours less than health workers and 4.5 hours than workers in 
public administration. There are also noticeable differences across countries. While the issue is negligible 
in Austria, Germany and Slovenia, the workload for workers in the education sector is lower than in the 
other sub sectors by 11 hours in Greece, 7 hours in Italy, 4 hours in Spain and 3 in Portugal.
18 As 
previously discussed, the size of the wage premium differs by gender and, on average, it is higher for 
women than for men for the sub sectors specification examined. 
 
Table 6: Results from OLS regression: coefficient of the dummy variable for public sector split in 
Public administration, Education and Health. 
Hourly gross earning for employees 
AT BE DE ES FR GR IE IT PT SI
TOTAL
PA 0.050 *** 0.070 *** 0.106 *** 0.244 *** 0.062 *** 0.188 *** 0.194 *** 0.161 *** 0.239 *** 0.129 ***
Edu. 0.245 *** 0.064 *** 0.085 *** 0.342 *** 0.049 *** 0.348 *** 0.322 *** 0.262 *** 0.277 *** 0.145 ***
Health 0.065 *** 0.017 -0.056 *** 0.168 *** 0.046 *** 0.151 *** 0.086 *** 0.161 *** 0.108 *** 0.061 **
Obs. 20187 7567 29743 41262 33477 14487 16750 63189 15259 10160
R2 0.373 0.339 0.36 0.42 0.204 0.461 0.395 0.371 0.521 0.258
F 522.5 240.0 491.7 620.6 164.5 628.2 445.3 941.0 841.6 188.9
MEN
PA 0.003 0.060 *** 0.025 ** 0.216 *** 0.043 *** 0.157 *** 0.156 *** 0.149 *** 0.192 *** 0.137 ***
Edu. 0.180 *** 0.024 -0.025 0.313 *** 0.035 0.284 *** 0.247 *** 0.168 *** 0.187 *** 0.032
Health 0.025 -0.049 *** -0.231 *** 0.180 *** 0.027 0.081 *** 0.063 * 0.183 *** 0.184 *** -0.011
Obs. 11132 4086 15028 23789 17309 8421 8379 35645 7985 5094
R2 0.376 0.356 0.435 0.401 0.221 0.442 0.382 0.374 0.459 0.263
F 278.0 142.0 325.7 339.2 87.7 380.8 292.1 555.1 362.3 101.2
WOMEN
PA 0.119 *** 0.086 *** 0.211 *** 0.283 *** 0.081 *** 0.239 *** 0.231 *** 0.187 *** 0.325 *** 0.118 ***
Edu. 0.276 *** 0.088 *** 0.188 *** 0.353 *** 0.054 *** 0.377 *** 0.357 *** 0.302 *** 0.312 *** 0.173 ***
Health 0.090 *** 0.046 *** 0.033 ** 0.168 *** 0.055 *** 0.185 *** 0.107 *** 0.156 *** 0.111 *** 0.070 **
Obs. 9055 3481 14715 17473 16168 6066 8371 27544 7274 5066
R2 0.33 0.318 0.252 0.431 0.177 0.485 0.408 0.369 0.576 0.268
F 215.4 122.4 152.8 309.2 82.2 314.3 220.8 475.2 586.4 126.6  
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%; ** denotes significance at 5%; * denotes significance at 10%. 
 
We then examine whether the size of the premium changes with the educational attainment (Table 
7). In many countries the public workers with the highest educational level enjoy a larger differential than 
those with lower educational attainments. This finding, compared to the results obtained by quantile 
analysis, suggests that high educated workers are not necessarily those earning the highest wages. It can 
be explained by the presence in some countries of different institutional arrangements concerning careers 
and wage determination across sectors: while in the public sector the individual may need a minimal 
educational achievement to get qualified for a particular job or to reach high occupational positions, in the 
private sector no specific requirement usually applies. 
Interestingly, when we split our sample between supervisors and non supervisors the results (not 
reported here) point to a significantly higher differential in favour of those who are not supervisors, with 
the largest difference estimated in the sample of women, suggesting that supervisors earn more than non 
supervisors and hence find themselves at the right end of the wage distribution.
19 
 
                                                       
18 Country specific analysis might provide more helpful insights  on the data issues of  the various countries examined but this 
analysis is beyond the scope of the present note. 
19 However, one should be cautious when comparing the results obtained using the two different definitions, as each respondent 
is asked about her/his supervisory activities, which brings some form of arbitrariness. The results are available upon request 
from the author.  20
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Table 7: Results from OLS regression by education: coefficient of the dummy variable for public 
sector  
Hourly gross earning for employees 
AT BE DE ES FR GR IE IT PT SI
TOTAL
Low edu. 0.129 *** 0.046 ** 0.220 *** 0.121 *** 0.035 * 0.157 *** 0.052 ** 0.155 *** 0.164 *** 0.019
Medium edu. 0.052 *** 0.050 *** 0.118 *** 0.178 *** 0.058 *** 0.193 *** 0.127 *** 0.196 *** 0.091 *** 0.175 ***
High edu. 0.214 *** 0.050 *** 0.082 *** 0.342 *** 0.061 *** 0.263 *** 0.303 *** 0.224 *** 0.412 *** 0.025
Obs. 20187 7567 29743 41262 33477 14487 16750 63189 15259 10160
R2 0.37 0.338 0.36 0.422 0.204 0.456 0.394 0.369 0.524 0.259
F 515.6 240.9 497.1 619.8 165.7 599.9 446.4 927.8 839.5 186.6
MEN
Low edu. 0.130 *** 0.047 * 0.135 0.143 *** 0.076 *** 0.169 *** 0.033 0.154 *** 0.159 *** -0.015
Medium edu. 0.002 0.033 ** 0.031 * 0.173 *** 0.035 ** 0.175 *** 0.131 *** 0.143 *** 0.203 *** 0.128 ***
High edu. 0.106 *** 0.019 0.014 0.306 *** 0.022 0.153 *** 0.257 *** 0.205 *** 0.256 *** 0.012
Obs. 11132 4086 15028 23789 17309 8421 8379 35645 7985 5094
R2 0.374 0.353 0.431 0.403 0.221 0.439 0.384 0.374 0.46 0.263
F 275.8 141.6 325.3 340 87.4 359.7 300.7 554.6 366.4 101.4
WOMEN
Low edu. 0.120 *** 0.074 ** 0.263 *** 0.125 *** 0.027 0.173 *** 0.108 *** 0.166 *** 0.181 *** 0.012
Medium edu. 0.106 *** 0.068 *** 0.189 *** 0.192 *** 0.081 *** 0.209 *** 0.127 *** 0.232 *** 0.007 0.184 ***
High edu. 0.297 *** 0.063 *** 0.189 *** 0.356 *** 0.067 *** 0.341 *** 0.314 *** 0.254 *** 0.506 *** 0.039
Obs. 9055 3481 14715 17473 16168 6066 8371 27544 7274 5066
R2 0.326 0.316 0.252 0.431 0.177 0.48 0.401 0.363 0.582 0.269
F 212.3 122.3 153.6 296.4 83.3 304.3 213.9 458.3 583.4 125.4  
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%; ** denotes significance at 5%; * denotes significance at 10%. 
 
 
Finally, we examine whether the wage differential between sectors differs when we consider the 
firm  size  (Table  8).
20  On  average,  when  we  control  for  this  job  specific  characteristic,  the  wage 
differential in favour of the public sector workers is generally confirmed. The differential is larger when 
public sector employees are compared to small firms employees than when compared to large firms 
employees.  With  respect  to  large  firms  employees,  in  Belgium,  France  and  Germany  public  sector 
workers are worse off. The wage difference between smaller and larger firms is generally similar by 
country and gender at about 15 20 percentage points; fixing the firm dimension, the average differential 
between men and women tends to be wider in the larger firms, although this evidence is mixed. 
 
Table 8: Results from OLS regression controlling for firm size: coefficient of the dummy variable 
for public sector as against small and large private firms  
Hourly gross earning for employees 
AT BE DE ES FR GR IE IT PT SI
TOTAL
<50          0.159 *** 0.153 *** 0.265 *** 0.307 *** 0.144 *** 0.260 *** 0.260 *** 0.239 *** 0.274 *** 0.215 ***
>=50         0.003     -0.032 *** -0.033 *** 0.143 *** -0.060 *** 0.089 *** 0.103 *** 0.095 *** 0.115 *** 0.030 *  
Obs.         20166     7569     29844     39678     33065     14487     16608     63189     15234     10130    
R2           0.39     0.371     0.392     0.437     0.221     0.469     0.399     0.384     0.53     0.272    
F            595.7     296.8     608.3     663.1     186.3     665.2     492.5     1032     879.9     214.5    
MEN
<50          0.107 *** 0.147 *** 0.196 *** 0.297 *** 0.137 *** 0.212 *** 0.255 *** 0.210 *** 0.266 *** 0.215 ***
>=50         -0.028 **  -0.041 *** -0.082 *** 0.130 *** -0.066 *** 0.049 *** 0.080 *** 0.078 *** 0.096 *** -0.013    
Obs.         11124     4085     15102     22645     17022     8421     8274     35645     7968     5082    
R2           0.396     0.394     0.461     0.423     0.242     0.455     0.398     0.388     0.477     0.29    
F            318     176.9     390.7     369     104.7     401.3     323.0     631.6     409.1     127.7    
WOMEN
<50          0.194 *** 0.153 *** 0.332 *** 0.310 *** 0.146 *** 0.304 *** 0.256 *** 0.268 *** 0.279 *** 0.195 ***
>=50         0.020     -0.020     0.022     0.153 *** -0.055 *** 0.118 *** 0.126 *** 0.104 *** 0.131 *** 0.055 ** 
Obs.         9042     3484     14742     17033     16043     6066     8334     27544     7266     5048    
R2           0.343     0.34     0.286     0.44     0.189     0.491     0.401     0.378     0.575     0.273    
F            243.5     149.9     201.5     313.2     89.5     331.4     233.5     495.7     575.2     136.2      
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%; ** denotes significance at 5%; * denotes significance at 10%. 
                                                       
20 The authors would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting to control for job features, such as firm size. 21
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All the above analysis considers the hourly wage as the variable of interest. However, one might 
argue that, as long as the hours worked are not a choice variable of the worker, the monthly earnings 
better represent the remuneration actually relevant for the employee. Accordingly, in Table 9 we report 
the coefficients of the public sector indicator when we use the very same model specification as in Table 
4, but the dependent variable is the monthly wage. It should be noticed that, if the hours worked per week 
is a relevant indicator for the earning process and there exists a correlation between the public sector 
indicator and the hours worked per week, the parameter of interest in Table 9 suffers from an omitted 
variable bias. For this reason we also performed an “augmented regression” analysis with the number of 
worked hours added to the standard set of regressors in our reference model.  The results indicate that in 
most cases the estimated differences are trivial compared to our reference model. 
 
Table 9: Results from OLS regression with monthly wage as dependent variable: coefficient of the 
dummy variable for public sector  
Monthly gross earning for employees 
AT BE DE ES FR GR IE IT PT SI
TOTAL
Public       0.099 *** 0.035 *** 0.151 *** 0.172 *** 0.033 *** 0.162 *** 0.162 *** 0.125 *** 0.109 *** 0.102 ***
Obs.         20187     7567     29743     41262     33477     14487     16750     63189     15259     10160    
R2           0.521     0.526     0.558     0.539     0.352     0.467     0.59     0.441     0.546     0.281    
F            1046.1     426.5     1267.8     881.1     310.2     577.9     1007     1281.9     949.5     220.2    
MEN
Public       0.039 *** -0.009     0.045 *** 0.136 *** -0.014     0.114 *** 0.14 *** 0.079 *** 0.071 *** 0.064 ** 
Obs.         11132     4086     15028     23789     17309     8421     8379     35645     7985     5094    
R2           0.422     0.449     0.577     0.438     0.312     0.424     0.537     0.41     0.463     0.272    
F            356.6     192.6     565.7     379.7     137     313.7     493.1     662.2     393.1     118.5    
WOMEN
Public       0.144 *** 0.073 *** 0.264 *** 0.202 *** 0.071 *** 0.204 *** 0.176 *** 0.172 *** 0.14 *** 0.113 ***
Obs.         9055     3481     14715     17473     16168     6066     8371     27544     7274     5066    
R2           0.483     0.504     0.462     0.568     0.33     0.461     0.575     0.4     0.597     0.298    
F            485.1     251.8     538.2     456.1     163.1     278.4     567.6     624     631.7     153.9      
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%; ** denotes significance at 5%; * denotes significance at 10%. 
 
On average the coefficients of the public sector indicator obtained using the monthly gross earnings 
specification are smaller than those using the hourly wage specification, by almost 3 percentage points 
and this differences is larger, in magnitude, for men than for women. In particular, for Spain and Portugal 
the magnitude of the differential decreases from 25 and 21 percent to 17 and 11, respectively.  As with the 
case of the hourly wage specification, we define three sub groups of countries where the conditional pay 
gap is smaller, equal or larger than the average: in Belgium and France the gap is smaller than the 
average, in Austria, Italy, Portugal and Slovenia it is close to the average and in Spain, Greece, Ireland 
and Germany it is larger. It is worth noting that in the case of Germany, the overall pay gap is larger than 
the average, as a result of a gap close to the average for men and much larger for women. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
In  this  paper  we  investigated  the  public private  wage  differentials  in  ten  euro  area  countries 
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Slovenia and Spain). To account for 
differences in employment characteristics between the two sectors, we focused on micro data taken from 
EU SILC,  a  data  set containing  comparable information  across  EU  countries.  The results  point  to a 
conditional pay differential in favour of the public sector that is generally higher for women, for workers 
at the low end of the wage distribution, in the Education and the Public administration sectors rather than 
in the Health sector. The differential generally decreases when considering monthly wages as opposed to 
hourly wages and if we restrict our comparison to large private firms. Notable differences emerged across 
countries, with Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain exhibiting higher public sector premia than 22
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other countries. Our results are broadly in line with those obtained from the existing country specific 
studies, outlined in the literature review section of this paper. 
Although we used the term “premium” to denote the differential obtained after controlling for the 
observable characteristics of the workers (to distinguish it from the pay gap observable in the raw data), it 
must be stressed that this definition might not be entirely appropriate, as there may be other relevant 
characteristics that affect the differential, which, because of data limitation, cannot be controlled for even 
in the analysis with micro data (these include, among others, fringe benefits, which are typically higher in 
the private sector, or pension rights generally higher in the public sector, but also non monetary factors, 
such as job security that is generally larger in the public sector). Furthermore, this study shares some of 
the same shortcomings as in the existing country specific studies, so some caution must be taken when 
drawing conclusions. The definition of public sector workers is not clear cut and, in addition, differs 
across countries. Furthermore, the number of worked hours may be misreported by the individuals, and 
hence the hourly wage on which we based our analysis may be incorrect (this issue may be particularly 
relevant in the Education sector); however, performing the analysis on monthly wages instead of hourly 
wages,  while  yielding  generally  lower  estimates  for  the  premium,  does  not  change  significantly  the 
overall  picture.  Finally,  there  may  be  a  sample  selection  bias  due  to  the  possibility  that  sorting  of 
employees between sectors is not random but occurs on  the basis of unobserved characteristics. This 
problem has been typically addressed in the literature by adopting a two steps procedure that purges the 
endogeneity between sector choice and the earning process in the first step, and estimate the premium in 
the second. As instruments, individual characteristics of employees that are thought to influence their 
preferences to work in one sector or another, such as family background, risk aversion or pro social 
vocation, have been used. Unfortunately, no variable suitable to instrument the sector choice is available 
in our data set. However, studies that control for possible endogeneity of the sector choice typically find 
substantially  higher  gaps,  suggesting  that  additional  motives,  other  than  monetary  ones,  may  induce 
people to seek employment in the public sector and that ignoring them may result in an underestimation 
of the overall advantage.
21     
We  also  briefly  documented  some  basic  features  of  the  institutional  setting  governing  wage 
determination in each country considered in our study. Although our documentation is far too simple to 
allow  us  to  draw  any  conclusion  on  a  possible  relationship  between  institutions  and  labour  market 
conditions in the two sectors, few remarks can be made. Indeed, our results seem to provide little support 
to the idea that a systematic comparison between wage levels in the two sectors is actually necessary or 
sufficient to guarantee non divergent wage dynamics: countries exhibiting the lowest conditional pay gaps 
are those where no such comparability principle has ever been applied. Moreover, we did not detect any 
specific  correlation  between  the  size  of  the  public private  wage  differential  and  either  the  unions’ 
bargaining power or the relative bargaining power of unions in private and public sectors. Interestingly, 
however, our results do not reject the idea that decentralization of wage setting by geographical areas may 
have  helped  achieving  wage  dynamics  in  the  public  sector  more  coherent  with  local  labour  market 
conditions and, therefore, lower public private wage differentials.   
 Two broad policy implications can be drawn from these empirical results. Firstly, the evidence 
for a premium may have played some role in the decisions to freeze or cut public sector wages in some of 
the fiscal consolidation programs undertaken in response to the increasing financial market tensions in the 
euro area (as in the cases of Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal). Secondly, an adjustment in the 
wage bill may also be achieved by increasing the number of hours worked per public sector employee, 
thereby reducing the number of workers necessary to provide a given quality of service, while leaving the 
monthly wage unchanged. Of course, when making these general prescriptions operational, sectoral and 
country specific features as well as efficiency considerations must be taken in due account. 
                                                       
21 Depalo and Giordano (2011) find that in Italy such additional motivations are particularly significant above the median of the 
wage distribution, precisely where other studies assuming random sampling use to find lower premia or even penalties. 
Similar results are obtained by Melly (2006) for Germany. Using data on France, instead, Bargain and Melly (2005) find that 
wages do not substantially differ across sectors after controlling for unobservable heterogeneity. 23
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Appendix I: country details. 
 
  AUSTRIA 
Institutional features  
The most important wage negotiations for public employees are the ones between the federal government 
and the union for public employees. These negotiations have a direct effect on the wages of federal 
employees only, but they have a signalling effect for the negotiations for the employees of states and 
municipalities. While there is no automatic indexation mechanism for federal employees, past inflation is 
taken into account in the negotiating process. A very important additional feature in Austria is that for 
around 60% of public employees labour contracts are under private law (these employees are called 
“Vertragsbedienstete”) and for the rest it is subject to public law (i.e. civil servants; these employees are 
called “Beamte”). While the probably most important difference between these two types of contracts 
concerns lay off protection (it is harder to dismiss “Beamte”), there are also differences in wage schemes 
(generally  higher  wages  for  “Beamte”),  social  contribution  rates  (no  upper  ceiling  for  pension 
contributions of “Beamte”) and pension entitlements (generally higher for “Beamte”). Furthermore there 
are substantial differences between wage schemes and pension entitlements of federal employees and 
non federal employees. 
Data on Earnings and Employment 
A series on public sector ‘wages and salaries’ is available from the General Government accounts from 
1990 onwards. A public sector employment series consistent with General Government accounts data on 
wages and salaries is only available from 1995 on and this series is not publicly available. Data for wages 
and salaries and the number of employees of the whole Austrian economy is taken from the National 
Accounts. Reclassifications of enterprises to the private sector (highway authority, enterprises owned by 
municipalities, hospitals …) induced structural breaks in these data series in 1997 and 2001.
22 
An alternative source for information on wages of public and private employees is the wage income tax 
statistic  (where  separate  data  on  public  employees  are  available).  According  to  this  source,  when 
controlling for age, full time employed private sector workers earn more on average than their public 
sector counterparts. 
BELGIUM 
Institutional features  
Wage bargaining for public employees is highly decentralised, involving negotiations between unions and 
the different governments (federal, regional and community). A Joint Committee is concerned with the 
minimum common rights, including the rules for automatic wage indexation, i.e. an automatic link to the 
health index, via a threshold mechanism that provides for increments in steps of 2%. Then, different 
committees negotiate for the federal services, by Region for the regional and local administration and by 
Community for the education sector, among others. In some cases, sectoral committees complete the 
decentralisation. There is no official benchmarking with the private sector. Health activities, mostly part 
of the private sector, are subject to separate negotiations held at national level. The proportion of public 
employees with civil servant status is on a downward trend and now accounts for only about half of all 
public employees. However, the differences between statuses concern mostly lay off protection, career 
opportunities and the pension system, while the wage bargaining and remuneration scale are similar for 
both statuses. 
Data on earnings and employment 
A series on public sector ‘wages and salaries’ is publicly available from the general government accounts 
from 1970 onwards. A series on public sector employment consistent with general government accounts 
data on wages and salaries is only available from 1995 on and this series is not publicly accessible. Data 
                                                       
22 Public employment according to ESA95 went down by 4% in 1997 and by 9% in 2001. 24
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for wages and salaries and the number of employees for the whole economy are taken from the national 
accounts and publicly available from 1995 onwards. 
One possible reason for the rather limited premium for the public sector compared to other countries is 
that the pension benefits – sometimes considered as a delayed remuneration   for similar careers are much 




General government (GG) employees can have very different status from short term subsidized jobs to 
“fonctionnaires” with their specific status and total job security. Besides, the civil service is divided into 
three categories: the civil service of the State, civil service of public hospitals and the civil service of local 
governments. Yet, some GG employees (hereafter public employment), for example social security funds 
employees, do not belong to these three categories. Besides, within each category, employees can have 
different statuses.  
Concerning wages, since 2008, comprehensive negotiations are set for a three year period for the civil 
servants. Besides, annual negotiations can provide some adjustments. Each negotiation sets the value of 
the  overall  wage  point  (a  wage  index)  and/or  compensation  increase  of  certain  categories  (specific 
measures). But public wage also automatically increases – especially those of the “fonctionnaires” – with 
seniority.  
Data on Earnings and Employment 
Payroll as well as the number of employees is available in national accounts data for GG, on a quarterly 
basis.  If  payroll  is  available  for  each  sub sectors  of  GG,  that  is  to  say,  the  State  level,  local 
administrations and social security funds, public employment is only available for GG as a whole. As a 
consequence, compensation and wages of public employment can only be analysed at the GG level in 
national accounts. Administrative sources are also available but they cannot easily be reconciled with 
national accounts data. Moreover, their scope is often civil services, more especially the State one. 
Aggregate data of national accounts do not allow disentangling compositional
24 effects on average wage 
and per se wage dynamics. An alternative data source is provided by the administrative data on civil 
servant wages, which are more detailed both on compositional effects and on the specific factors that 
drive  public  wage  evolution.  This  comprehensive  information  is  nevertheless  only  available  for  the 
central  level  and  hardly  reconcilable  with  national accounts  data. This  data uses  a  specific  concept: 
“rémunération des personnes en place” (RMPP) which means the average wages of an individual who is 
employed at two successive periods. The RMPP evolution depends on three factors: the wage point 
evolution, the specific measures and the automatic evolution (see above). According to available data, 
RMPP increased by 3.7% / year in average between 2000 and 2007. The first two factors contributed each 
to  0.9  pp  /  year  while  the  automatic  increase  linked  to  seniority  contributed  to  almost  2  pp  /year. 
Moreover, according to the same administrative data, the average wage of State civil servants increased 
by 2.1% /year between 2000 and 2007, compared to 3.7%/year for the RMPP. Compositional effects are 
thus non negligible. 
GERMANY 
Institutional features  
Collective wage bargaining for public employees on the federal and the municipality level are between 
federal and local government and the union for public employees. Wages at the level of the Länder are 
negotiated between representatives of this government level and the same union. There is no automatic 
indexation mechanism for employees. An additional feature in Germany is that for about 45% of public 
employees, labour contracts are under private law (these employees are called “Angestellte”) and for the 
rest it is subject to public law (these employees are called “Beamte”, i.e. civil servants). The differences 
between these two types of contracts refer to protection form termination (it is quite hard to dismiss civil 
                                                       
23 As statistical and national accounts criterions do not necessarily properly reflect economics and administrative point of views, 
the following presentation is simplifying the actual situation. 
24For example, if a retiring senior civil servant is replaced by a young lower paid civil servant, aggregate wages can decrease 
though no wages, at a micro level, decrease.  25
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servants), wage schemes and pension entitlements (the latter generally higher for civil servants). Civil 
servants do not have to pay mandatory social security contributions, thus they are not covered by the 
general health insurance. Instead, they are partly supported by governmental assistance (“Beihilfe”) and 
usually pay for additional private health insurance.  
Data on Earnings and Employment 
The series on public sector ‘wages and salaries’ and employment are available from 1991 onwards. A 
drawback of these series is that they are not publicly available. Data for wages and salaries and the 
number of employees of the whole German economy is taken from the National Accounts. 
GREECE 
Institutional features  
The system for setting wages in Greece is different for workers in the private and the public sector. 
However, in 2010 there have been important changes in relation to the institutional features of collective 
bargaining in Greece.  
In the public sector pay is determined by law, according to the government’s annual income policies. Law 
2738/1999 that recognises the right to collective bargaining in the public sector, but from the bargaining 
procedure pay issues are excluded. Employment in the public sector is secure and public servants once 
hired enjoy lifetime contracts and cannot be discharged, except for misconduct. In Greece, public sector 
wage increases were given by cost of living and budget conditions, and private sector comparability is not 
a standard. On October 6, 2011 the Greek government submitted a law in the Greek parliament to adopt a 
unified pay scale for all public servants. 
Data on Earnings and Employment
25 
There  is  a  difference  between  public  servants’  average  gross  earnings  and  the  “compensation  per 
employee”. In the latter instance, the numerator also includes outlays for central government pensions, 
according to an accounting “convention” that reflects the fact that, in the Budget, wage and pension 
outlays are reported together. It should be noted that sometimes the rates of change of the two categories 
of outlays differ markedly (i) because of differences between the wage policy and the pension policy, and 
(ii) because the increase in the number of pensioners entails a more rapid rise in the “compensation per 
employee”, since the denominator of this figure includes only the number of employees in active service. 
Introductory Reports to the State Budget (IRSB) data on central government’s wage bill cover almost 
85% of the “general government” sector and, specifically, comprise staff costs for central administration 
employees, teachers, judges, law enforcement staff, public hospital staff and the administrative staff of 
regions and prefectures. The Armed Forces staff is not included in the number of employees, although 
their wages are included in the costs. The local authorities’ staff is not included either, although certain 
wage subsidies to local authorities are included. Data refer to civil servants under both tenured and non 
tenured status. The main methodological problems relate to (i) the non coverage of certain parts of the 
general government sector, (ii) the fact that wage costs cover certain categories (e.g. military officers) that 
are not included in the published data on employment. This is why it is not possible to make correct 
calculations of the level of compensation per employee.  
In certain cases, adjustments/corrections need to be made to the published figures on expenditure and 
employment in order to ensure comparability over time. Therefore, the relevant amount should not be 
taken into account for comparison over time, given that substantial amounts were paid in the previous 
years for wage outlays by the Special Accounts, which were not reported in the Budget. 
IRELAND 
Institutional features 
Over  recent  times,  wage  setting  in  Ireland  has  been  heavily  influenced  by  ‘Social  Partnership 
Agreements’, namely, formal wage agreements between trade unions, employers and the Government. 
These agreements began in 1987 as a direct response to high levels of unemployment and industrial 
                                                       
25 Bank of Greece (2010), Monetary Policy, Annual Report, March 2010, pp.124 125 (in Greek). 26
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unrest. The agreements cover a wide range of areas including pay, with agreed rates of pay increases set 
out covering a number of years. The coverage of these agreements in the private sector tends to be lower 
and furthermore employers can invoke an “inability to pay” clause. In addition to such wage agreements, 
two ‘Benchmarking’ reports were carried out, seeking to compare the public and private sectors in terms 
of work, pay and benefits. The 2002 Benchmarking study resulted in an 8.9 per cent average increase in 
public sector pay. A further Benchmarking study in 2007 found that salary levels in public services 
compared well with the private sector. In a limited number of cases, some pay increases were awarded. 
In Ireland, there were sizable increases in public sector wages between 2000 and 2004 reflecting increases 
awarded under the first Benchmarking exercise and increases scheduled under national pay agreements. 
This resulted in a widening of the unadjusted public private sector wage differential over this period. 
Data on Earnings and Employment 
A series on public sector ‘wages and salaries’ is not published in the National Accounts and, as a result, 
wage data is instead taken from the General Government accounts. In particular, data on ‘wages and 
salaries’  is  derived  from  the  broader  ‘compensation  of  employees’  series  which  also  includes  the 
employer’s social security contribution, with data available on an annual basis from 1990 onwards. A 
public sector employment series consistent with General Government accounts data on wages and salaries 
is  not  available.  However,  the  Department  of  Finance  publishes  estimates  provided  by  Government 
departments at the beginning of each year. The series covers the period 1992 2009. As regards whole 
economy data, the wages and salaries series is taken from the National Accounts. Employee data from the 
Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS) published by the Central Statistics Office is used. The 
QNHS is a quarterly household survey designed to produce labour force estimates. 
ITALY 
Institutional features  
The  wage  determination mechanism  in  the  Italian public  sector  has  been  interested by  a  number  of 
reforms until the introduction in 1993 of the current legislation, which assigned a larger role to collective 
bargaining and created an independent agency (Agenzia per la Rappresentanza Negoziale nella Pubblica 
Amministrazione   ARAN) responsible for negotiating pay levels and working conditions for most public 
employees. Wages are negotiated between ARAN and the more representative unions of the employees, 
once the budget law has set the resources devoted to collective bargaining for the central government; for 
the  other  public  administrations  the  bargaining  has  to  take  into  account  the  parameters  set  in  the 
government official programmes. Wage contracts are renewed separately for different areas (ministries, 
local government, health, education, and others) and for managerial positions.  
The objectives of the 1993 reform were various. In general, it aimed at a “privatization” of employment 
relations in the public sector, that is, at making pay and employment condition determination mechanisms 
in the public sector closer to those in the private sector (by envisaging a greater role for negotiation, 
imposing tighter constraints to wage growth, replacing the automatic component for wage increases with 
schemes based on merit).  
Almost two decades after the introduction of the reform, many analysts agree that the reform failed to 
achieve its main targets. Differences between public and private sectors, regarding not only pay levels but 
also labour conditions, are still present and maybe widened since then. Furthermore, wage differentials 
vary significantly both over time and across different categories of workers and geographical areas.      
Data on Earnings and Employment 
Series on public sector ‘wages and salaries’ and employment are available from the General Government 
accounts from 1980 onwards. Data for wages and salaries and the number of employees for the whole 
economy is taken from the National Accounts. 
PORTUGAL 
Institutional features 
Wage  setting  in  the  public  and  private  sectors  in  Portugal  differs  substantially.    Wages  of  public 
employees  are  defined  according  to  the  respective  categories  in  wage  scales  applying  nationwide. 27
ECB




Advancement used to be almost completely determined by seniority, but a recent reform has endeavoured 
to  link  advancement  to  performance  evaluation.  Pay  raises  usually  apply  uniformly  throughout  the 
categories of public employees and levels of government. Normally, there is bargain over the annual pay 
raise  between  government  and  the  unions,  but  the  final  figure  does  not  necessarily  result  from  an 
agreement between the two parties. For instance, in some recent years government has imposed a freeze 
of  the  wage  scales.  The  readiness  by  government  to  accept  higher  updates  reflects  often  electoral 
considerations, beyond the tightness of the budget constraint. 
Private wage setting is much more decentralized and private sector unions tend to be relatively weak. 
There is no tradition of using ‘benchmarking exercises’ comparing the public and private sectors in terms 
of work, pay and benefits, as a basis to adjust the pay of public sector workers. 
Data on earnings and employment 
Information about the overall personnel expenditure of government comes from the items ‘compensation 
of employees’ and ‘wages and salaries’ in the National Accounts of general government. A public sector 
employment series consistent with these national accounts data is available only with some years delay.  
Banco de Portugal assesses the evolution of public wages on the basis of, among other things, the wage 
scale updates and a drift to account for employee advancement and special adjustments to the wage scales 
of specific categories of civil servants. The evolution of public employment is inferred from data on the 
number of retirees and an estimate of the hiring of new employees each year. Such estimates of the flows 
are anchored on the levels of public employment coming from the Public Administration Census to obtain 
a public employment series. These latter censuses (available for 1996, 1999 and 2005) are the most useful 
source,  on the public sector  side, to  calculate  wage  gaps  and  premia  because  of  their  coverage  and 
inclusion of detailed information about workers’ characteristics. 
As  regards  whole  economy  data,  the  sources  include  the  National  Accounts and,  in  the  case  of the 
employment, the Employment Survey which is carried out on a quarterly basis. Another source of wage 
data  for  the  private  sector  is  remunerations  declared  to  social  security  for  the  collection  of  social 
contributions. Comprehensive backdata on earnings and workers in the private sector are available from 
Quadros de Pessoal, a yearly mandatory questionnaire for all private employers. 
SPAIN 
Institutional features 
Public employees can be grouped into two broad classes: civil servants (funcionarios) and other public 
sector employees (personal laboral). The former are by far the most numerous and are regulated by 
administrative  rules  (access  by  public  examinations and  very  high job  security),  while the latter are 
regulated by the general rules of the labour market. With respect to generation of pensions, most public 
employees  follow  the  rules  of  the  Social  Security,  while  central  government  civil  servants  are  an 
exception and pay social contributions to the Central Government itself which is also responsible for 
paying  their  pensions  (the  so called  “clases  pasivas”).  Recently,  the  government  passed  legislation 
aiming at homogenising this duality, in such a way that newly hired central government civil servants will 
contribute and receive pensions from the Social Security. 
Although in some cases, agreements were reached between the Central Government and representatives 
of public employees regarding wage increases, there is no actual wage bargaining, as is the case for the 
private sector. In fact, the Central Government has failed in some cases these agreements. 
Public employment is divided by approximately 1/3 in the Central government and 2/3 in the Regional 
and Local levels of governments. Despite the strong decentralization carried out in Spain, the Central 
Government has continued annually setting the maximum wage increase applying to all public employees 
in the Budget Law. 
Data on employment and wages 
So far the National Accounts does not provide data on employment in the general government sector. 
There are a couple of sources on public employment (with details about levels of government), although 
not entirely consistent between themselves or with the National Accounts. On the one hand, the Statistical 
Bulletin of Central Personnel Registry publishes data bi annually (for the middle and the end of each 28
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year) with a delay of more than 6 months. On the other hand, the Labour Force Survey provides quarterly 
data on government employment. Finally, the category employment in non market services (National 
Accounts) can also be used to proxy non published truly National Accounts data. From the three sources 
of data mentioned, the first one (Personnel registry) is the one favoured by the Banco de España in its 
analyses. 
With respect to wages, data are taken from the compensation of employees of the National Accounts, 
although this variable includes a share of pensions (the so called "clases pasivas”). With a considerable 
delay, the General State Comptroller (IGAE) also offers concrete details of wages and salaries of active 
public employees. 
SLOVENIA 
Institutional features  
Throughout  the  1990's  Slovenia  underwent  a  transition  from  self management  to  a  market  oriented 
economy and this period was also marked by important changes in the labour market. It is estimated that 
by the years 2000 – 2001 the transition in the labour market was completed (Vodopivec, 2004). The 
major change at the end of 1980s was the right of employers to lay off workers, although this option was 
extremely costly for the employer, and collective bargaining was introduced at that time. Compared with 
other transition economies, Slovenia's regular employment protection stayed much stricter in the 1990s 
(Riboud, Sanchez Paramo, and Silva Jauregui, 2001). 
The structure of collective agreements in the private sector was centralized until 2006, after which it 
became more decentralized. The last general collective agreement for private sector expired in 2007 and 
so far no new general agreement was reached, although sectoral agreements do exist for some private sub 
sectors. The collective agreements structure for the public sector is centralized and the main agreement 
reached is Collective Agreement for the Public Sector, but also further sub sectoral agreements in public 
sector  are  present.  Collective  agreements  cover  a  wide  range  of  areas  including  wages  and  their 
indexation.  From  the  mid 1980's,  when  it  was  still  a  part  of  Yugoslavia,  until  several  years  after 
independence in 1991, Slovenia experienced hyperinflation.  The indexation of wages both in private and 
public sector followed quite a complicated formula, which has been simplified over time in line with 
decreasing inflation rates. In the environment of hyperinflation at the beginning of 1990's, wages were 
indexed  to  a  certain  portion  of  monthly  inflation  growth  rates  and  were  corrected  each  month.  The 
frequency of alignment was reduced from every month to every three months in the mid 1990's and to 
twice a year at the end of 1990's. From 2004 onwards it only occurs once a year. Monthly inflation 
growth rates were also replaced by annual (sometimes core) inflation rates. From 2001 onwards, expected 
inflation was used, although the indexation was not complete – that is, the full proportion of inflation has 
not always been taken into account in the indexation formula throughout the period under investigation.  
As a social component of wage policy, Slovenia introduced mandatory minimum wages in 1995. They 
were typically indexed to inflation in the same way as other wages, and in some years to GDP growth. In 
relation to average wages they remained relatively constant at 40% of average monthly gross wages until 
March 2010, when this ratio jumped to 50% because of the increase in the minimum wage. 
Data on Earnings and Employment 
Aggregate data on public sector earnings and employment are published by the Statistical Office of the 
Republic of Slovenia (SORS) and also by the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Public Legal 
Records  and  Related  Services  (AJPES).  The  SORS  data  are  available  using  a  national  accounts 
methodology on quarterly and annual frequency since the year 1995 and in a database of labour market 
statistics (which is not necessarily internationally comparable) on a monthly basis since the year 2000. 
However the classification used in the national accounts methodology is NACE Rev. 1.1 and in the labour 
market statistics database is NACE Rev. 2, so appropriate approximation of sectors must be considered 
when comparing the data from the two sections. For some data categories on public sector earnings and 
employment, breakdowns by institutional sector are also available, so data on the General Government 
sector (S.13) can be found. The AJPES data on average wages and number of employees in public sector 
have a monthly frequency and are available since September 2003. In order to be comparable with other 
countries  being  analised,  the  SORS  data  from  the  national  accounts  for  activities  (L)  public 
administration, (M) education and (N) health and social work employees were used here. 29
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One possible reason for the relatively small public sector premium as compared to other countries is the 
inherited socialist tradition, which was oriented towards equality of all workers.  30
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Appendix II: macro stylized facts under alternative definition of public sector 
 
This Appendix presents some stylised facts in relation to public and private sector pay, in particular the 
pay gap, on the basis of compensation data for public and private sectors and for the whole economy 
under both the General Government definition and the NACE ‘LMN’ definition of the public sector for 
the period 1995 2008. As employers' social security contributions can differ somewhat across countries 
reflecting variation in institutional features, growth in wages and salaries (i.e. compensation of employees 
excluding employers' social security contributions) in the public and private sector are also presented for 
the general government and LMN sectors. As it can be seen from Table IIa, where the public sector is 
defined as general government, cumulative growth in compensation per public sector employee differs 
substantially across countries, ranging from 21.6 per cent in Germany to 173.7 per cent in Slovenia.
  
Furthermore,  gross  compensation  per  employee  grew  relatively  fast  in  Spain  and  Portugal,  whereas 
growth was more modest in Austria, Belgium, France and Italy. Cumulative growth of compensation per 
employee has been higher in the general government sector than in the private sector in four of the ten 
countries examined, namely, Belgium, Germany, Spain and Italy. 
When comparing General Government data with the NACE classification of the public sector, as 
defined above, growth rates for total economy in the period 1995 2008 seem to be broadly in line for all 
countries, with the exception of Italy and, to a lesser extent, Spain, where growth is somewhat higher 
under the general government definition. According to the NACE classification, cumulative growth in 
compensation per employee was higher in the private sector than in the public sector in Austria, France, 
Germany and Slovenia.
26 
When  comparing  general  government  data  from  Table  IIa  with  Table  IIb,  no  substantial 
difference in the growth in wages and salaries per employee and compensation per employee can be 
found for the total economy except in the case of Italy. Some variation is however apparent when the 
public sector is defined as LMN sectors. Focusing on Table IIb, the growth in wages and salaries are 
higher  in  public  than  in  private  sector  except  for  Austria,  Portugal,  Slovenia  and  France,  whereas 
Germany is showing mixed results depending on the definition of the public sector considered. 
 
 
Table IIa – Cumulative Growth in Compensation per Employee (1995-2008 % in nominal terms)  
General government Private Sector Total Economy LMN sectors Private Sector Total Economy
AT 27.9 31.8 29.5 26.7 31.6 30.2
BE 48.4 38.3 40.5 43.5 40.1 41.0
DE 21.6 14.2 14.4 14.4 16.0 15.7
ES n.a n.a n.a 63.6 47.2 50.4
FR 38.9 42.1 41.6 n.a n.a n.a
FR (1999 - 2008) 23.8 32.6 30.6 28.7 29.0 29.0
GR (2000 - 2008) n.a n.a n.a 26.1 20.8 22.3
IE (1998 - 2008) n.a n.a n.a 74.5 67.8 71.4
IT 61.6 41.9 45.6 34.6 27.5 29.2
PT 71.4 74.8 72.5 n.a n.a n.a
PT (1995 - 2007) 69.1 69.1 68.0 67.2 67.1 68.0
SI 173.7 205.2 200.3 174.4 203.1 198.4
Notes: Data for Austria refer to LMNO sectors. Data for Germany refer to LN sectors.
Sources: Data on compensation per employee for public sector defined as general government are taken from the national accounts statistics
or, in some cases, from national central banks estimations. Data on compensation per employee in public sector defined as LMN sectors are
obtained from national accounts statistics.
Public sector defined as general government Public sector defined as LMN sectors
Country
    
                                                         
26 It is important to note that average growth rates are not necessarily a good indicator of common dynamics among both sets of 
data. 31
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Table IIb – Cumulative Growth in Wages and Salaries per Employee (1995-2008 % in nominal 
terms)  
  
General government Private Sector Total Economy LMN sectors Private Sector Total Economy
AT 27.3 34.1 31.7 28.2 35.4 33.2
BE 45.2 38.4 39.9 41.4 39.4 39.9
DE 19.3 15.3 15.1 14.4 16.9 16.4
FR (1999 - 2008) n.a. n.a. n.a. 27.1 31.9 30.7
GR (2000 - 2008) n.a. n.a. n.a. 20.0 16.5 17.5
ES 78.1 48.2 52.7 n.a. n.a. 49.2
ES (1995-2007) 65.8 40.3 43.8 59.7 35.2 40.2
IE (1998 - 2008) n.a. n.a. n.a. 68.6 66.4 69.1
IT 64.6 49.4 52.1 62.6 40.0 44.9
PT 53.8 76.8 69.7 n.a. n.a. n.a.
PT (1995 - 2007) 50.9 69.8 64.0 52.7 59.9 64.0
SI n.a. n.a. n.a. 179.0 213.6 207.5
Note: Data for Austria refer to LMNO sectors. Data for Germany refer to LN sectors. 
Sources: Data on wages and salaries per employee for public sector defined as general government are taken from the national accounts statistics 
or, in some cases, from national central banks estimations. Data on wages and salaries per employee in public sector defined as LMN sectors are
obtained from national accounts statistics or, in some cases, from national central bank estimations.




Furthermore, to compare the evidence from aggregate data with that obtained on the basis of 
micro  data,  in  Table  III  we  report  some  measures  of  the  wage  gap,  as  well  as  the  share  of  public 
employees in total employment, in the period 2004 2007.   
 
Table III – Ratio between compensation per employee in public and private sector, ratio between 
wages and salaries per employee in public and private sector, share of public sector workers in total 
employment in the period 2004 – 2007 
 
Public Sector 
defined as general 
government
Public Sector 
defined as LMN 
sectors
Public Sector 
defined as general 
government
Public Sector 
defined as LMN 
sectors
General government LMN sectors
AT 1.31 1.05 1.20 0.98 15.2 29.8
BE 1.08 0.96 1.02 0.94 22.2 32.2
DE 1.39 0.94 1.32 0.92 11.0 16.1
FR 0.92 0.93 n.a. 0.87 24.6 30.0
GR n.a. 1.27 n.a. 1.23 n.a. 31.1
ES 1.50 1.27 1.49 1.27 15.2 22.2
IE n.a. 1.27 n.a. 1.31 n.a. 24.3
IT 1.39 1.33 1.34 1.29 20.8 24.0
PT 1.76 1.67 1.59 1.54 16.9 22.0
SI 1.20 1.17 n.a. 1.14 19.1 20.4
Note: Data for Austria refer to LMNO sectors. Data for Germany refer to LN sectors.
Sources: Data for public sector defined as general government are taken from national accounts statistics or, in some cases, from national
central banks estimations. Data on public sector defined as LMN sectors are obtained from national accounts statistics or,  in some cases, 
from national central bank estimations.
Country
Compensation per employee Wages and salaries per employee Share in total employees (%)
 
 
Finally, in Figure I, developments in the public private pay gap, as measured by the public 
private wage ratio, over the 1995 2010 period, under the various wage and public sector measures are 
presented.
27 
                                                       
27  The  pay  gap  for  NACE  sector  ‘L’  (  “Public  Administration  and  Defence”)  only  is  also  used  to  proxy  public  sector 
developments in this figure. 32
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As highlighted above, the differential is generally much lower if measured in terms of wages and 
salaries than that calculated on the basis of compensation per employee. Due to the statistical treatment of 
public pension systems in some countries,
29 the wage gap calculated from wages and salaries is more 
appropriate to look at. 
 
Figure I – Ratio between compensations per employee (wages and salaries) in public and private 
sectors 
(WP_CE_GG = compensation per employee, public sector defined as general government, 
WP_CE_LMN = compensation per employee, public sector defined as LMN sectors, WP_CE_L = 
compensation per employee, public sector defined as L sector, WP_NW_GG = wages and salaries, public 
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29 In the case of Belgium and Spain, where pensions are directly paid by the public employer, compensation of employees also 
includes expenditure for public sector pensioners (as imputed social security contributions). Moreover, in the case of Portugal 
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29 shows that the wage gap as calculated for the general government sector 
was narrowing until 2002 in Austria and increasing thereafter. The reduction was stimulated by faster 
growth of wages in the private sector than in the public sector (also due to the consolidation packages 
implemented to join EMU). The widening of the wage gap post 2002 reflected the substantial increases in 
agreed wages in the public sector and the reduction of working time in the private sector. 
In Belgium, the wage differential in favour of the public sector follows an upward trend from the 
mid 1990s, albeit with some limited periods of stabilization. 
In France, average wages in the public sector were growing faster than in the private sector until 
2000; subsequently and until the current crisis, the situation was reversed. 
The wage gap was relatively stable in Germany from 1999 onwards due to government efforts to 
contain wage pressures in the public sector. For example, vacation payment and Christmas bonuses have 
been  reduced  significantly,  entry  wages  have  been  lowered  considerably  and  automatically  wage 
increases due to growing age have been abolished. Some relaxation in the public sector wage policy took 
place in 2009 and as a result, the wage differential has since increased. 
Comparable General Government data for Greece and Ireland were not available for this period 
and it is therefore difficult to draw definite conclusions on the calculation of the wage gap using macro 
data. 
In Italy, the gap was about 20% in 1980 and, mainly owing to particularly favourable contracts 
renewals  in  the  public  sector  at  the  end  of  the  1980s,  almost  reached  40%  in  1990.  It  decreased 
substantially  until  1995,  reflecting  the  broad  fiscal  consolidation  effort  undertaken  to  fulfil  the 
requirements for the participation to the monetary union. The public private wage differential started 
increasing again at the beginning of this decade, to reach 35% in 2009. The wage differential began to 
increase again post 2000 as the stance of fiscal policy has loosened somewhat. 
                                                       
29 More details on the development of the pay gaps of individual countries are provided in the Country Appendix.   34
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In Portugal, the wage differential is relatively high, which is mainly explained by the gap in the 
qualifications of the workers in the public and private sectors. This differential was on an upward trend 
from the mid- 1990s, but has narrowed since the mid-2000s; however, when calculated on the basis of 
wages and salaries
31, this narrowing started around 2003 following the implementation of restraining 
measures on public wage growth. 
The wage gap in Spain fell in the second part of the 1990s due to public wage bill restraint, while 
it increased as of the end of the decade, on the back of improved economic and fiscal conditions. 
Since the mid-1990s, the public-private wage differential in Slovenia was on a downward trend, 
with some reversal due to the enhanced bargaining power of the public sector unions. The inflation 
criterion which was one of the preconditions for entering monetary union, contributed to the downward 
trend until 2007, after which, the gap increased due to the implementation of public sector wage reform.  
The wage differentials calculated on the basis of Eurostat data for NACE sectors ‘LMN’ are 
generally lower than those calculated under the ESA 95 General Government classification. One possible 
explanation for such differences is that workers engaged in the activities of sectors ‘LMN’ not included 
under the general government classification earn relatively low wages as compared to the wages in the 
general government sector (or alternatively more of them are not employed on a full time basis).  
We also present calculations of the wage gap when only sector L, "public administration and 
defence", is considered as public sector. In this case the gap is higher than for the LMN sectors, except for 
Spain, and lower than for the general government, except in Slovenia, France and (for most of the years) 
in Portugal, whereas for Italy it varies somewhat across years.  
                                                      
31 As highlighted above, the evolution of the two items for Portugal differs because compensation of employees used to include 
the amount spent by the State to finance the deficit of the former social security system of civil servants (recorded as social 
contributions). 35
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Appendix III: developments since the onset of the financial and economic crisis 
 
Recent developments reflect the consolidation needs of most EU governments, in form of wage and 
employment moderation and, in some cases, even cuts in public sector wages and employment. 
In Austria, after the very high increase in agreed public wages for 2009, it has been indicated 
several times that public employees will have to carry a part of the consolidation burden (as they did in 
the pre EMU consolidation phase in the mid 1990s); the agreed wage increases for 2010 and 2011 were 
indeed rather low (but still positive).  
In Belgium, given the high level of spending for total compensation of employees, which reached 
as much as 12.6% of GDP in 2010, it is often argued that there should be consolidation in this field of 
expenditure, too. However, the focus is on the number of employees, rather than on their remuneration or 
the amount of their pensions. 
As there is no rule of indexation of the public wages (neither on inflation nor on private wages), 
in France public wages were roughly not affected by the crisis. Public wages slightly decelerate from 
2.2% in 2008 to 2.0% 2009 in nominal terms, 2010 data being not yet available. On the contrary, wages 
in the private firms were more severely hit by the crisis: they decelerate from 2.9% in 2008 to 1.4% in 
2009 in nominal terms and yearly average. This evolution derives from several factors: low negotiated 
increases due to the adverse environment and short time work schemes leading to lower than usual pay 
for concerned employees. 
In Germany, labour unions and employers’ associations mostly agreed on comparatively long 
settlements with no increase in regular pay but one off payments in the first half of the contract period 
and moderate increases in regular wages in the second half. In the context of the fast and strong recovery, 
trade unions now claim higher wage increases in the private sectors. So, while firms in the private sector 
are expected to gain from the economic recovery in the next two years, and negotiated wages might 
increase significantly in 2012, the total volume of public debt and the urgent need for fiscal consolidation 
will somewhat restrain wage growth in the public sector.  
In the case of Ireland, the public sector pay increases scheduled under the terms of the National 
Wage  Agreement,  ‘Towards  2016’,  due  in  2009  were  not  paid.  Furthermore,  public  sector  pay  was 
effectively  cut  in  2009  via  the  introduction  of  the  public  service  pension  levy,  a  pension related 
deduction. There was a further formal cut in public sector pay on a tiered basis in 2010, as part of the 
2010 Budget. A further development has been the successful conclusion of talks between the Government 
and the leadership of public sector unions, as detailed in the “Public Service Agreement”. The pay policy 
element of the “Public Service Agreement” states that there will be no further reductions in public sector 
pay between 2010 and 2014. 
As  regards  Greece,  the  income  policy  for  the  central  government,  and  the  various  measures 
announced in 2010, in nominal terms are estimated to have led to a decrease in average gross earnings of 
civil servants by 9.5% and in the average earnings of people working in public enterprises by 5.5%. In 
2010 the decrease in gross (pre tax) earnings, in real terms reached 13.5% for civil servants and 9.0% in 
total economy. This was achieved by cuts in overall wage allowances (by 12% for the first 5 months and 
by 20% for the remaining 7 months) and cuts in Easter and Christmas bonus payments (with complete 
abolishment  for  employees  earning  more  than 3,000  euro  per  month).  Furthermore,  there  have  been 
substantial measures cutting earnings of employees of public enterprises. Since July 1, 2011 a further cut 
in  government  sector  employees’  allowances  of  the  order  between  20%  and  50%  has  been  applied. 
Furthermore, a unified pay scale for all public servants will be applied as of November 1, 2011. 
In Italy wage freezes (and cuts above a certain threshold) for public employees are envisaged in 
the consolidation package which was approved in summer 2010. Thus, a slight decrease is expected for 
public wage expenditure in relation to GDP starting in 2011. 
As regards Portugal, given the sharp deterioration of general government accounts in 2009 and 
the need to correct the budget imbalance, the wage scale for public employees was not updated in 2010. 
In the framework of subsequent expenditure restraint measures, in 2011 an average wage cut of 5% was 
implemented. 36
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In the case of Spain, most recent developments show that the fiscal consolidation plans of the 
Spanish government rely heavily on compensation of employees’ restrain. In particular, public wages per 
employee suffered an average 5% cut in 2010, and were frozen for 2011. As regards employment, there 
has been a change in past decades’ trend given measures aiming at restraining new hires and at 
constraining the replacement rate to 10% (only 1 in 10 retirees can be replaced) implemented since late 
2009 by the Central government, and since mid-2010 by all levels of the General Government sector. 
Finally, in the case of Slovenia, since the condition of the general government budget deteriorated 
as a consequence of financial and economic crisis, public sector wages also underwent government 
austerity measures. The most important occurred in 2010. It caused the postponement of wage increases 
in public sector that were planned in accordance with the new determination of public sector wages from 
2008 on (the so-called "elimination of wage disparities") to the next year in which GDP growth will reach 
2.5%. Besides that, the government also lowered indexation of public sector wages in the 2010 - 2012 
period (to a different extent in each of the years). The government also announced that it intends to cut 
the number of public sector employees by 1% per year until the year 2013, although it has not specified 
any details regarding how this is to be achieved. 
 37
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1406
December 2011
References 
Albert, C., J. F. Jimeno and G. Moreno (1999), “Pay determination in the Spanish public sector”, in R. 
Elliot, C. Lucifora and D. Meurs (eds.), Public sector pay determination in the European Union, London: 
McMillan Press Ltd., pp. 191-239. 
Bank of Greece (2010), Monetary Policy 2009-2010, March (in Greek). 
Bardasi, E. (1996), “Public-private wage differentials: a microeconometric analysis”, Lavoro e relazioni 
industriali, 3, 3-51 (in Italian). 
Bargain, O. and B. Melly (2008), “Public sector pay gap in France: New evidence using panel data” 
Discussion Paper Series, IZA DP, No. 3427 
Beffy, M. and T. Kamionka (2010), “Public-private wage gaps: is civil-servant human capital sector 
specific?”, INSEE document de travail. 
Bender, K. A. (1998), “The central government-private sector wage differential”, Journal of Economic 
Surveys,  vol.12(2), pp. 177-220. 
Bender K. A. (2003), “Examining equality between public- and private-sector wage distributions”, 
Economic Inquiry, vol. 41(1), pp. 62-79. 
Bender, K. A. and R. F. Elliot (1999), “Relative earnings in the UK public sector: the impact of pay reform 
on pay structure”, in R. Elliot, C. Lucifora and D. Meurs (eds.), Public sector pay determination in the 
European Union, London: McMillan Press Ltd., pp. 285-339. 
Boyle, G., R. McElligott and J. O’Leary (2004), “Public-private wage differentials in Ireland, 1994-2001”, 
ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary, Special Article, Summer, Dublin: The Economic and Social 
Research Institute. 
Brunello, G. and C. Dustmann (1997), “Public and private sectors wages in Italy and Germany: a 
comparison based on microeconomic data”, in C. Dell’Aringa (ed.), Rapporto ARAN sulle retribuzioni, 
Collana ARAN, Franco Angeli (in Italian). 
Cai, L. and A.Y.C. Liu (2008), “Public-private wage gap in Australia: Variation along the distribution”, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Paper No. 581, (June), Canberra, Australia: The 
Australian National University. 
Campos, M.M. and M.C. Pereira (2009), “Wages and incentives in the Portuguese public sector”, 
Economic Bulletin, Banco de Portugal, Summer, pp. 57-77. 
Centeno, M. and M. C. Pereira, “Wage determination in general government in Portugal”, Economic
Bulletin, Banco de Portugal,, Autumn 2005. 
Chatterji, M., K.  Mumford and N. Peter (2010), “The Public-private sector gender wage differential: 
Evidence from matched employee-workplace data”, Forthcoming in Applied Economics.  
Comi, S., P. Ghinetti and C. Lucifora (2002), “The distribution of wages in the public and private sectors: a 
disaggregated analysis”, in C. Dell’Aringa and C. Lucifora (eds), Dinamica occupazionale salariale, Vita e 
Pensiero (in Italian). 
De Castro, F. and P. Hernández de Cos (2006). “The economic effects of exogenous fiscal shocks in Spain: 
a SVAR approach”, Banco de España, Documento de Trabajo, No. 0604, pp. 9-31. 
Dell’Aringa, C., C. Lucifora and F. Origo (2007), “Public sector pay and regional competitiveness: a first 
look at regional public-private wage differentials in Italy”, The Manchester School, 75, 4, 445-478. 
 
Depalo, D. and R. Giordano (2011), “Are public sector workers paid too much? A quantile regression 
approach under sector sorting”,  Giornale degli economisti e annali di economia, Vol. 70, no. 1, pp. 25-64. 
Dustman, C. and A.V. Soest, (1997), “Wage structures in the private and public sectors in West Germany”, 
Fiscal Studies, vol.18, pp. 225-247. 
Ehrenberg, R. G. and J. L. Schwarz (1986), “Public sector labor markets”, in: O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard 
(eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 2, Amsterdam, North-Holland, pp.1219-1268.  38
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1406
December 2011
Elliott, R.F, Murphy, P.D. and Blackaby, D.H. (1996) “Pay in the Public and Private Sectors:  A Study 
Using the GHS”, University of Aberdeen, Department of Economics Occasional Paper on Public Sector 
Pay Series, pp. 96-02. 
European Industrial Relations on-line (EIRO), articles on Slovenia on http : // 
www.eurofound.europa.eu/eiro/2010/country/slovenia.htm. 
Fernández-de-Córdoba, G., J. J. Pérez and J. L. Torres (2011), “Public and private sector wages 
interactions in a general equilibrium model”, Public Choice, forthcoming. 
Foley, P. and F. O’Callaghan, (2009), “Investigating the public-private wage gap in Ireland using data from 
the National Employment Survey 2007”, Statistical and Social Inquiry Society. 
Forni, L. and R. Giordano (2003), “Employment in the public sector”, CESifo, Working Paper 1085. 
García-Pérez, J. I. and J. F. Jimeno (2005), “Public sector wage gaps in the Spanish regions”, Documento 
de Trabajo del Banco de España, nº 0526. 
Giordano, R. (2010), “The public sector pay gap in Italy”, Politica Economica, 26, 2, 285-310 (in Italian). 
Gregory, R. G. and J. Borland (1999), “Recent developments in public sector labour markets”, in O. 
Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3C, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 
pp.3573-3630.  
Hartog, J. and H. Oosterbeek (1993), “Public and private sector wages in the Netherlands”, European 
Economic Review, vol. 37(1), pp. 97-114. 
Holm-HadullaҖ, F., K. KamathҖ, A. Lamoґ, J. J. Pérez and L. Schuknecht (2010),  “Public  wages  in  the  euro 
area: towards securing stability and competitiveness”, ECB Occasional Paper Series, n. 112, June. 
IMAD, Spring Forecast of Economic Trends 2009, April 2009, 53. 
IMAD,  Spring Forecast of Economic Trends 2010, April 2010, 61. 
IMAD, Wages, productivity and Competitiveness (2007), Economic Issues. 
http://www.umar.gov.si/fileadmin/user_upload/publikacije/izzivi/AtrgDela.pdf 
Jürges, H., (2002), “The distribution of the German public-private wage gap”, Labour, vol. 16 (2), pp. 347-
381. 
Kajzer, A. et al. (2006), Labour Market Developments in Slovenia in 1995-2005. Working paper 5.  
Kanellopoulos, C.N. (1997), “Public-private wage differentials in Greece”, Applied Economics, Vol. 29(2), 
pp.1023-32. 
Katz, L. F. and A. B. Krueger (1991), “Changes in the structure of wages in the public and private sectors”, 
Working Paper No. 3667, NBER, Cambridge, MA. 
Katz, L. F. and A.B. Krueger (1993), “Public sector pay flexibility: Labor market and budgetary 
considerations” in Pay Flexibility in the Public Sector, OECD, Paris, pp. 43-77. 
Kelly, E., S.McGuinness,  and P. O’Connell, (2009), “The public-private sector pay gap in Ireland: What 
lies beneath?”, Working Paper No. 321, Economic and Social Research Institute. 
Kioulafas, K., G. Donatos, and G. Michailidis, (1991), “Public and private sector wage differentials in 
Greece”, International Journal of Manpower, Vol.12, pp. 9-14. 
Lamo, A., J. J. Pérez and L. Schuknecht (2007), “The cyclicality of consumption, wages and employment 
of the public sector in the euro area”, ECB Working Paper, No 757, (May). 
Lamo, A, J. J. Pérez and L. Schuknect (2008), “Public and private sector wages: co-movement and 
causality”, ECB Working Paper Series No. 963 (November). 
Lamo, A, J. J. Pérez and L. Schuknect (2011), “Public or private sector wage leadership? An international 
perspective”, Scandinavian Journal of Economics. Forthcoming. 
Lucifora, C. and D. Meurs (2006), “The public sector pay gap in France, Great Britain and Italy”, Review of 
Income and Wealth, vol. 52(1), pp. 43-59.  39
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1406
December 2011
National Gazette (2002), Public Sector Salary System Act, No. 56. 
National Gazette (2008), Collective Agreement for Public Sector, No.57. 
National Gazette (2002), Employment Relationship Act, No. 42. 
National Gazette (2006), Collective Agreements Act, No. 43. 
Papapetrou, E., (2004), “Gender wage differentials in Greece”, Bank of Greece, Economic Bulletin, Vol.23, 
pp.57-78. 
Papapetrou, E. (2006), “The public-private sector pay differential in Greece”, Public Finance Review, Vol. 
34(4), pp.450-73. 
Pérez, J. J. and A. J. Sánchez-Fuentes (2011), “Is there a signaling role for public wages? Evidence for the 
euro area based on macro data”, Empirical Economics. Forthcoming. 
Melly, B. (2005), “Public-private sector wage differentials in Germany: Evidence from quantile 
regression”, Empirical Economics, vol. 30(2), pp. 505-520. 
Melly, B. (2006), “Public and private sector wage distributions controlling for endogenous sector choice”, 
Universität St. Gallen, discussion paper. 
Mincer, J. (1974), “Schooling, Experience, and Earnings”, New York: NBER Press. 
Moore, W J. and J. Raisian (1991), “Government wage differentials revisited”, Journal of Labor Research, 
vol. 12(1), pp. 13-33. 
Mueller R. E. (1998), “Public-private sector wage differentials in Canada: Evidence from quantile 
regressions”, Economics Letters, vol. 60(2), pp. 229-235. 
Papapetrou, E. (2006), “The public-private sector pay differential in Greece”, Public Finance Review, vol. 
35(4), pp. 450-473. 
Ponthieux, S. and D. Meurs (2005), “The gender wage gap in Europe: women, men and the public sector”, 
Direction des Statistiques Démographiques et Sociales, Document de travail F0502. 
Portugal, P. and M. Centeno (2001), “Wages of civil servants”, Banco de Portugal, Economic Bulletin, 
September. 
Poterba J. M. and K. S. Rueben (1994), ‘The distribution of public sector wage premia: New evidence 
using quantile regression methods’, Working Paper No.4734, NBER, Cambridge, MA 
Rees, H. and A. Shah (1995), ‘Public-private sector wage differential in the UK’, The Manchester School, 
vol. 63(1), pp. 52-68. 
Riboud, M., Sanchez-Paramo, C., Silva-Jaregui, C. (2001), “Does eurosclerosis matter? Institutional reform 
and labor market performance in central and eastern European countries in the 1990s”, in B. Funck and L. 
Pizzati, eds., Labor, Employment, and Social Policies in the EU Enlargement Process: Changing 
Perspectives and policy Options, Washington, D.C.: World Bank. 
Smith, S. P. (1976), ‘Pay differentials between federal government and private sector workers’ Industrial
and Labor Relations Review, vol. 29(2), pp. 179-97. 
Smith, S. P. (1977), ‘Equal pay in the sector: Fact and fantasy’, Research Report No. 122, Princeton, 
Industrial Relations Section, Princeton University.  
Strauss, H. and C. Maisonneuve (2007), “The wage premium on tertiary education: new estimates for 21 
OECD countries”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 589. 
Tepe, M. and D. Kroos (2010), Lukrativer Staatsdienst? Lohndifferenzen zwischen öffentlichem Dienst 
und Privatwirtschaft, WSI-Mitteilungen 1/2010, 3-10. 
Visser, J. (2006), “Union membership statistics in 24 countries”, Monthly Labor Review, January, 38-49. 
Vodopivec, M. (2004) “Labor Market Developments in the 1990s”, in M. Mrak, M. Rojec and C. Silva-
Jauregui, eds., From Yugoslavia to the European Union. 40
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1406
December 2011
Vodopivec, M. (2005) “Analiza mobilnosti dela in fleksibilnost sistema plaþ”, in A. Kajzer et al., Labour 
Market Developments in Slovenia in 1995-2005, Working paper 5 (2006). IMAD 
 Working PaPer SerieS
no 1118 / november 2009
DiScretionary  
FiScal PolicieS  
over the cycle
neW eviDence  
baSeD on the eScb 
DiSaggregateD aPProach
by Luca Agnello  
and Jacopo Cimadomo